......... a difference between Allawi's plan to walk away from the government and those of Sadr. Looks like some of our earlier specualtions BELOW were correct.
Sadr ministers out, now what?
[/size]In a sudden move, Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has pulled his ministers out of the Iraqi cabinet. Many people are asking me why. It's a good question, and I've being thinking about the reasons and implications. They aren't very easy to determine because of the jumpy, and often illogical, way that this political faction thinks and behaves.
One possible theory being circulated is the six ministers were already on their way to be replaced according to PM Maliki's cabinet reshuffle plan. So the resignations were like quitting your job before your boss fires you in order to preserve your dignity and save face.
But this explanation strikes me as overly simplistic.
The faction's threat to leave the government, and the decision to go forward with it, took place while other developments elsewhere, in the country in which the Sadr group is a major player, were taking place and may have played a role in the decision..
What I think is that Sadr is making a decision in which he plans to switch from half-government-half-opposition status to all-out opposition.
This has not been declared explicitly so far.
Why? Because while Sadr's followers are still quite strong, whether in the political wing or in the Mehdi army, they haven't and appear incapable of achieving the level of exclusive dominance they aspire to. They can make serious trouble and occupy the streets for a while when they want, but those periods of time aren't enough for them anymore.
Thus far, the results of the war between Sadr on one side and the government and the coalition on the other side - particularly in the southern part of the country- have been a disappointment for Sadr. It's likely that he's considering adopting a new approach by openly declaring his party in the opposition.
In Diwaniya, his militiamen have been defeated and the Iraqi and coalition forces are back in control. In Hilla, the Mehdi army members are being dealt with as outlaws by the local security forces. At least one of Sadr's offices was burned a few weeks ago, and the statements by local officials during the last month or two clearly showed determination on not letting the militia take over the city.
It's actually a complex situation because this approach will very likely be different from the one Sadr used back in 2003 and 2004 when his group was yet to become part of the political process. Back then, Sadr was the spiritual leader as well as the field commander of his militia, publicly endorsing his fighters and not hiding his involvement in the armed "resistance".
In my opinion, Sadr and his political wing will now pretend to distance themselves from the armed wing, which is what they've been doing for some time now, while actually keeping -if not increasing- the support for armed operations against military and civilian targets. at the same time, they will try to drive more people into opposing the government and the presence of coalition troops with spectacular protests here and there. And they will find nothing wrong if those "peaceful protesters" occasionally decide to use force and shoot at Iraqi and US soldiers or eliminate those who collaborate with the government and the coalition, because "that's not us, not the Mehdi army. It's the people's reaction to an incompetent government and an illegal occupation".
Now that they have left the government, they're going to take advantage of simple-minded people who will no longer blame them for lack of basic services, because the Sadrists are not part of this government anymore. They will redirect all the blame onto Maliki and the coalition, when in fact, it was the Sadr bloc ministers who were controlling three of the most important ministries in charge of basic services: Health, Education and Transportation, in addition to three others.
That's a point dwarfed by the militia's direct role in Iraqi's suffering.
Hints of this new policy are already in the air: the Sadrists organized large protests in Basra yesterday, in which reportedly thousands chanted against the local government in demand of better services and warning of an escalation if their demands are not met. Meanwhile the al-Fadheela Party, to which the governor belongs, said it was afraid some group might assassinate him. Of course, Sadr's aides denied any involvement in the planning of the protests and protestors were carrying Iraqi flags instead of Sadr's banners as usual. Still, not many people really bought the act.
Sadr is of the kind of tyrant who would try all methods he can to either control the entire nation of Iraq or, if he fails, destroy it altogether.
His inability to control the country from within the political process makes me think that he'll try for the latter.
Finally, it's worth noting that the words which Sadr used to close his message to Maliki this week, were technically an open threat.
In the Islamic culture, the expression "Assalam ala man Ittaba' al-Huda" (or "peace be upon those who follow the right path") includes more threats than wishes for peace: its implied meaning is "Follow the right path [our path] or face the consequences."
Let's take a look at the explicit coup intentions that don't only want to return to the days of dictatorship but want to take us back to the dark ages: (Texas Gentleman's View)
23/05/2007 21:52 (توقيت غرينتش)
أكدت مصادر مقربة من مقتدى الصدر زعيم التيار الصدري المتواري عن الانظار أن المرحلة المقبلة في العراق ستشهد سيطرة مؤيدي الصدر على الحكومة من خلال تجنب الاشتباك مع القوات الأميركية، واعتماد التصعيد الخطابي المطالب بخروج القوات الأجنبية وتعزيز المكاسب السياسية في بغداد والجنوب وتقوية العلاقات مع إيران.
وأشار تقرير لوكالة الأسوشيتدبرس الأربعاء إلى ان الصدر يخطط لملء الفراغ الذي سيخلفه الانسحاب الاميركي من العراق ومرض منافسه عبد العزيز الحكيم الذي يعاني من سرطان الرئة. ونقل التقرير عن عدد من المسؤولين في التيار الصدري، رفضوا الكشف عن اسمائهم، أن استراتيجية الصدر تعتمد جزئيا على الاعتقاد السائد من أن الادارة الاميركية ستسحب قواتها من العراق قريبا أو انها ستخفض عددها هناك مخلفة فراغا امنيا وسياسيا كبيرين.
وكان وزير الدفاع العراقي عبد القادر العبيدي صرح يوم الإثنين بأن الجيش العراقي يضع خططا استعدادا لاي انسحاب أميركي مفاجيء. وأضاف المسؤولون الصدريون أن الصدر يعتقد أن حكومة المالكي لن تصمد في حال خروج القوات الأميركية بسبب فشلها في الملف الأمني والخدمي والاقتصادي، مما سيقود إلى تشكيل تحالفات سياسية جديدة يكون فيها التيار الصدري الذي يشغل 30 مقعدا في البرلمان الرابح الأكبر.
وأوضح أحد المسؤولين الصدريين الستة الذي تحدثوا لوكالة اسوشيتدبرس "أن التيار الصدري منح حكومة المالكي فرصة تاريخية، إلا أن رئيس الوزراء لم يستثمرها، لذا فإننا نعد العدة كي نشكل القيادة الجديدة للعراق". وأضاف أن العراق سيكون إسلاميا في ظل قيادة التيار الصدري.
ويقول المسؤولون الأميركيون إن الصدر موجود في إيران منذ ثلاثة أشهر، فيما بدأ عدد من المقربين منه مؤخرا بالاعتراف بأن الصدر موجود فعلا في إيران، وليس كما أشيع في البداية من أنه عاد إلى النجف. وفي المقابل قام المجلس الأعلى للثورة الإسلامية سابقا والمجلس الأعلى الإسلامي العراقي حاليا، الحليف الشيعي الآخر لإيران، باعتماد بعض التغييرات السياسية من قبيل تغيير الاسم وإعلان التمسك بمبدئي حقوق الإنسان والديموقراطية، في خطوة فسرت على أنها محاولة حثيثة من قبل تيار الحكيم للاقتراب من أميركا بشكل أكبر. إلا أن إصابة الحكيم بمرض سرطان الرئة أبعده، ولو بصورة مؤقتة، عن الساحة السياسية، حسب تقرير الوكالة.
وأشار التقرير الى أن الشيعة يعرفون ماذا تعني سيطرة التيار الصدري على الحكومة العراقية، من خلال التشدد الديني الذي يفرضه جيش المهدي في مدينة الصدر، حيث يفرض على البنات منذ سن السابعة ارتداء الحجاب الإسلامي، ويمنع بيع المشروبات الحكولية، ويطبق تشريعات إسلامية يعاقب فيها بعض الناس بالجلد.
ونقل التقرير عن نصار الربيعي، عضو البرلمان عن التيار الصدري قوله انهم يريدون نظاما رئاسيا مشابها لحكم الخليفة الإسلامي. أما غفران الساعدي وصالح العكيلي عضوا مجلس النواب فأكدا أن التيار الصدري سيسعى إلى تصحيح خطأه عندما امتنع من المشاركة في انتخابات يناير/ كانون الثاني عام 2005 والتي أدت إلى هيمنة تيارات شيعية منافسه
للتيار الصدري على مجالس محافظات الوسط والجنوب.
One of the six Sadr movement officials told AP that "The Sadr movement offered Maliki a historic opportunity but the Prime Minister didn't use it. That's why we are planning to form the new leadership of Iraq" and added that Iraq will be Islamic under the leadership of the Sadr movement.
Sources close to Moqtada Sadr affirmed that the coming stage in Iraq will witness the control of Sadr's followers over the government through avoiding confronting the American forces and using verbal escalation to demand the departure of foreign troops, improving political gains in Baghdad and the south and strengthening the relations with Iran.
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OR ( Salims view) from a reporter Texas Gentleman has some respect of.
[size="3"]An Enemy We Can Work With ???By BARTLE BREESE BULLLondon
WHEN the populist Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr emerged from 14 weeks of invisibility on May 25, it was hard not to focus on his typically passionate anti-Coalition rhetoric: "No, no to America; no, no to occupation," he thundered from the mosque at Kufa, Iraq, a ragged town a few miles north of rich holy city of Najaf.
It reminded me of my first visit to the Kufa mosque, in August 2004. I had just walked and driven up from Najaf, where Mr. Sadr's second great uprising against Coalition troops was in its dying stages after more than three weeks. I was the only visible foreigner in the mosque for an unusually packed and angry Friday prayers.The mosque, which Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army was using as a hospital of sorts, had just been hit by something that everyone said was an American rocket. The shoes of dead fighters lay in piles inside the entrance. Outside, thick, angry crowds milled around.
That was almost three years ago. Mr. Sadr's re-emergence — American officials say he had been hiding in Iran, while his followers say he was lying low around Najaf — in such a suggestive place was undoubtedly meant to be a reminder of the young cleric's disruptive potential. But I think the real lesson about Mr. Sadr's return is subtler, and far more positive.
It is no accident that he preaches from the Kufa mosque rather than the more prestigious one at Najaf. As the site of the tomb of Imam Ali, the great martyr of Shiism, Najaf is the center of the Shiite clerical hierarchy, a Vatican of sorts for the faith. It is a rich city.
But Moktada al-Sadr leads a movement of the poor, inherited from his father, who inherited it from an uncle. His singsong exhortation in Kufa last week was a direct reference to the most famous cry from his father's epic, and ultimately suicidal, sermons under Saddam Hussein in the 1980s: "Yes, yes, to electricity. Yes, yes, to water." Young Mr. Sadr speaks not for the elites but for the biggest and most deprived group of people in Iraq: the Shiite lower orders.
And this is why if he really wanted the Americans to leave tomorrow, we would know about it.
He is the only Iraqi religious leader to have militarily stood up to the Coalition in the four years since the invasion (he did so twice, first in the spring and then in the late summer of 2004). When Mr. Sadr fights, he fights. His followers may continue to participate in a few freelance kidnappings and homemade bomb attacks, but a true Sadrist uprising is more like an earthquake.
Fortunately, Mr. Sadr is supporting what remains of hope in Iraq far more actively than it appears. For example, when the current security plan began in Baghdad in January, one of the first moves was the setting up of a joint American-Iraqi outpost in the slum of Sadr City, the young cleric's "back yard."
I remember being in Sadr City during one of the 2004 uprisings. I watched as Iraqis tied an American soldier's boot to a balcony, a gruesome trophy. A year later I saw the same boot in the same place. It was a warning symbol: the area was essentially no-go for the Americans. During the long spells of relative peace American platoons would roll through on quick patrols or stop on a street corner to oversee distribution of gasoline for maybe half a day. But they wouldn't linger.
Sadr City is Moktada al-Sadr's place, and the Americans have never come close to subduing it. There would not be an American forward outpost permanently stationed there, with patrols going out every day, if Mr. Sadr didn't want it. The fact is that back in January, the whole thing was closely and specifically negotiated between the Americans, the Iraqi government and Mr. Sadr's people.
Likewise, when Mr. Sadr withdrew all six ministers of his party from the cabinet in April, it was greeted by the press as a prelude to Iraq's next great cataclysm. Few recalled that he had done more or less the same last fall, in protest at Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's meeting in Jordan with President Bush. That gesture, greeted with similar alarmism, was followed two months later, as this one will be, by a return of the Sadrists to their posts.
Nor did most commentators note that even as he pulled out of the cabinet, Mr. Sadr was keeping his 30 members in Parliament, or that the ministries he was given sway over in the power-sharing agreement were still being run by their Sadrist appointees.
The Sadrists' cooperation with their own government gets ever deeper. An Iraqi friend of mine in Baghdad recently tagged along with a Mahdi Army element on a mission to Baghdad's Dora neighborhood, a particularly bloody place where the Mahdi Army used to play an active role in protecting Shiites from Sunni "cleansing." My friend and the Sadrists drove to Dora at midnight, confirmed that the Iraqi Army was there and keeping the Shiite families safe, and went home.
There is also much concern in Washington and elsewhere that Mr. Sadr may be a pawn of the Iranians. This notion ignores the history of his movement and the essential nationalism underlying his project. By allying themselves with and speaking for the Shiite poor, Mr. Sadr and his father have long differentiated themselves from the traditional Shiite hierarchy in Najaf, with its great wealth and its ties to Iran.
The Sadrist movement has always been about Iraq for the Iraqis. They might accept help from Iran — and I saw Iranian supplies in their compounds in Najaf in 2004 — but the movement is not for sale. Mr. Sadr gets his strength from the street. And the Arabs of the Iraqi street have no time for Persian bosses.
Nor do they seem to want to foment an all-out civil war. For all the time I have spent with Sadrist death-squad leaders who focus on killing former Baathists and Al Qaeda's supporters (Sunnis all), I have spent just as much time with Mahdi men who have been sent by their leaders to protect Sunni mosques after Sunni provocations, lest Shiites retaliate too broadly.
It was no coincidence that in February, a few weeks after the Baghdad security plan started, a Sunni mosque was reopened in Sadr City. Nor is it a coincidence that the current plan, while it has largely failed to stop car bombs, which are primarily a Sunni phenomenon, has for the moment more or less ended the type of violence in which the Mahdi Army participated most: roving death squads.
Why would Mr. Sadr cooperate with the Americans and Mr. Maliki's government? While he runs the biggest popular movement in the country, his followers are far from a majority. He is doing exactly what any other rational actor would do: He keeps up the angry rhetoric, and he plays ball with the democratic project.
For proof, look back to the key political event in post-invasion Iraq: the December 2005 elections. For months beforehand, Mr. Sadr railed against the legitimacy of elections held under foreign occupation. The press salivated over the coming apocalypse. But I spent several weeks at that time living with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City. Behind the scenes, they were committed to full, active and peaceful participation. Eventually Mr. Sadr joined the main Shiite coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and placed 29 of his candidates in Parliament, the second-largest among the Shiite bloc.
The real story about Moktada al-Sadr is not his exciting sermons but his broad underwriting, both passive and active, of the official project in Iraq. Since he stood down his forces in August 2004, he has provided the same narrative time and again. It is what we should expect from the canniest politician in Iraq: the rhetoric of the dispossessed, and the actions of an heir to power.