Battle of Baghdad
BY NIBRAS KAZIMI
August 9, 2006
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/37573
For the past few weeks, Baghdad was astir with news of an imminent coup d'etat. Those in power were worried, and those near power were looking forward to a political reshuffle from which they would emerge ahead. The scene included ambitious officers who half-jokingly promised plush diplomatic posts to their civilian friends, and prominent politicians who assumed that the military conspirators would call upon them to lead the country through a government of national unity. Desperate times require desperate measures, and most of the Iraqi political class in the Green Zone reasoned that the Americans could see no way out in Iraq except through bringing in a man of steel to save the day. No more rowdy democracy, no more muddled constitutional interpretation; stability would be measured by boots marching in unison and military bands banging away in tune.
I was recently challenged to a bet by a prominent Iraqi officer: the Americans will give the go ahead to the Iraqi Army to seize power within six months. I was looking forward to meeting this officer, who had made a name for himself in the press as a can-do enforcer giving chase to the terrorists. He was relatively young, charismatic and confident. But he was also afflicted with every Middle Eastern officer's fantasy: the belief that he alone can bring about national order and glory. As the head of a security brigade, his men had recently been outfitted with armored troop transports and heavy guns, and he made the claim to me that he could occupy Baghdad in four hours. He believes that it was only a matter of time until the Americans come to him and ask him to take over. If he wins, I buy him lunch, and if I win, well, I get to vote again in three years for a new parliament.
Iraq has had a bad experience with coups; after all, the Saddam regime came about through one. There had been such a rash of coups in the 1950s and 1960s and in some of these coups, an American hand could be discerned, including the first time the Ba'athists came to power while riding a tank through the palace gates.
Baghdad is paralyzed with fear, the shops are closed and the streets are empty. It seems that entire middle class neighborhoods have moved to Amman, Damascus, and Cairo. It has never looked or felt so bad, never mind the numbers of innocents who are daily getting chewed up by sectarian strife. In despair, there are many who would trade away such messy luxuries as freedom, democracy and constitutional rights for khaki-tinged tidiness. Hence the whispers and now audible warnings of a coup in the making.
But barring a serious (not to mention disastrous) turn-around in American policy, such a jarring change in the political order will not come about. Most Iraqi army officers, when asked if they were planning something illegal, did not even feign a commitment to their limited role as guardians of Iraq's defenses under the command of a civilian leadership, but rather dismissed such speculation by saying that they can't do much with the American military in Iraq looking over their shoulders. But the desire for a coup is there, and that in itself is a dangerous flaw in how the new Iraqi military is being trained by the Americans — even though they are nominally the only level of oversight holding them back.
Iraq's new defense minister, General Abdel-Qader Al-‘Ubaidi, gets many accolades both from the officers under him as well as the politicians in the cabinet and parliament. He was a good choice for the job, but an unconstitutional one. The founding document of Iraq's democracy states that no one in uniform can take on a civilian governmental position after leaving the armed services, unless a specified period of time had elapsed. It was ordained so with Iraq's history of turbulent coups in mind, and as a reminder to the military brass that it was the civilians who now called the shots. This was not the case with General ‘Ubaidi, who left his command of Iraq's infantry and took on the defense portfolio without the constitutionally mandated grace period. What is more dangerous is that no one is talking about it. That encourages the younger officers to be contemptuous of the political leadership and await an opportunity to seize the controls for themselves.
Ayad Allawi's camp is fueling talk of a military take-over, with the caveat that the Americans want him back in charge of a national unity government. Some are also interpreting the charm campaign by the suave and gentlemanly deputy commander of Iraq's Joint Forces Command, General Nasier Abadi, who was making the rounds in Washington and New York last week, as an American Plan B to introduce a new Iraqi face for some future political exit strategy. The whole thinking is precipitated on the notion that liberal democracies cannot fight virulent insurgencies, and that only a military dictatorship can hold Iraq together. But officers are trained to kill and destroy, not to build and govern. All too often, this basic fact is forgotten in the Middle East and elsewhere.
The battle for Baghdad can be won by the Iraqi government and Coalition forces in three weeks. There is a one month opening until mid-September to convince Iraq's middle class — the people who run the country and keep it together — that the state is still salvageable. Otherwise, with the summer drawing to a close, they will have to decide whether their exile and hiding is going to be of a more permanent nature and will plan ahead accordingly. The good news is that Sunni insurgency is exhausted and there is plenty of internal chatter questioning just how long they can keep up the pace of the violence. Their equal numbers in mayhem, the Mahdi Army militias, have descended into a chaotic grab for money, rather than a concerted effort to wage a civil war. The latter are not Hezbollah, and they can be confronted and scattered relatively easily. Secure Baghdad, and those who stand against the state will be demoralized and broken, and the middle-class will be tempted to risk retaking their country back from the hooligans. Success hinges on how many people can be made to believe that victory is still tenable.
The nascent political process in Iraq is worth sacrificing for. In the grand scheme of things, the prognosis for Iraq looks much healthier than the stale regimes around it in the Middle East, each resting for now atop a nest of time bombs. Although the numbers of dead and dying speak otherwise, the storm has passed Iraq, and there are many positive achievements to take advantage of in order to cripple the militias and the insurgents further, and to begin the process of turning them back. One such advantage is the new and disciplined Iraqi army that clearly enjoys confidence and leadership. Such a tool should not be encouraged to spend its time contemplating idle fantasies of a coup, but rather should be wielded now in an all or nothing battle for the preservation of the state of Iraq.
Mr. Kazimi can be reached at nibraska@yahoo.com
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The Battle of Baghdad
By ZALMAY KHALILZAD
August 23, 2006; Page A10
BAGHDAD -- Although there has been much good news to report about security progress in Iraq this summer -- the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the handover of security responsibility for Muthanna province, the fifth of 10 Iraqi Army Division Headquarters to assume the lead in its area of responsibility -- Iraq faces an urgent crisis in securing its capital, Baghdad. Although Iraqi leaders and the Coalition have a sound strategy to turn the situation around, it is vital that Iraqis control sectarian violence and come together against the terrorists and outside powers that are fomenting the violence.
In July, there were 558 violent incidents in Baghdad, a 10% increase over the already high monthly average. These attacks caused 2,100 deaths, again an increase over the four-month average. More alarmingly, 77% of these casualties were the result of sectarian violence, giving rise to fears of an impending civil war in Iraq. While statistics should not be the sole measure of progress or failure in stabilizing Iraq and quelling violent sectarianism, it is clear that the people of Baghdad are being subjected to unacceptable levels of fear and violence.
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This trend is especially troubling because we cannot achieve our goal of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq if such devastating violence persists in the capital. Baghdad represents one-fifth of Iraq's total population, and is a microcosm of Iraq's diverse ethnic and sectarian communities. Baghdad is also Iraq's financial and media center, the latter of which is especially important given that the declared strategy of the terrorists and violent sectarian groups in Iraq revolves around creating a perception of growing chaos in an effort to persuade Americans that the effort in Iraq has failed. Therefore, violence in Baghdad has a disproportionate psychological and strategic effect.
The deterioration of security in Baghdad since February's attack on the Samara Mosque is the result of the competition between Sunni and Shiite extremists to expand their control and influence throughout the capital. Although the leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq has been significantly attrited, it still has cells capable of operating independently in Baghdad by deploying car bombs to Shiite neighborhoods. At the same time, Sunni and Shiite death squads, some acting as Iranian surrogates, are responsible for an increasing share of the violence. This cycle of retaliatory violence is compounded by shortcomings in the training and leadership of Iraq's National Police. To combat this complex problem, Iraq's national unity government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has made securing Baghdad its top priority. The government's Baghdad Security Plan has three principal components:
• Stabilizing Baghdad zone by zone: Four Iraqi Army battalions, two Coalition brigades and five military police companies will be redeployed to Baghdad, resulting in more than 12,000 additional forces on the city's streets. The National Police will simultaneously undergo intensive retraining, with each brigade to be subjected to a three-day assessment period, with its leadership evaluated and, if necessary, replaced. Each brigade will subsequently receive additional training focused on countering violent sectarianism before redeployment. Over the last 10 days this approach began to be implemented in five areas of Baghdad -- Doura, Ghazaliyah, Rashid, Ahmeriyya and Mansour. In coming weeks other districts will be added.
Iraqi government and Coalition forces are adopting new tactics to stem sectarian killings. Increased checkpoints and patrols are being used to deny freedom of movement and safe haven to sectarian killers. The leaders of the death squads are being targeted. Security forces have started to work with cross-sectarian neighborhood committees. These and other new tactics will drive toward the goal of achieving security neighborhood by neighborhood. As each district of Baghdad is secured, operations will expand into contiguous zones over coming weeks and months.
• Disrupting support zones: Even as Iraqi and Coalition forces concentrate on securing specific neighborhoods, they will continue to conduct targeted operations in other zones that are staging areas for the violence. This includes targeted raids and other operations on areas outside of Baghdad's center, where planning cells, car-bomb factories and terrorist safe houses are located. This will degrade the ability of the terrorists and death squads to mount offensive operations into the areas we are working to stabilize.
• Undertaking civic action and economic development: One of the most tragic elements of the increasing violence in Baghdad is that it has robbed the Iraqi people of the sense of normalcy they desperately seek after living under crushing tyranny for more than three decades. In the immediate aftermath of Iraq's liberation, the entrepreneurial spirit of the Iraqi people was demonstrated as Baghdad's shops overflowed with consumer goods prohibited under the previous regime. However, the increasing violence in the streets of Baghdad has forced many Iraqis to close their shops for fear of their safety.
Consequently, after joint Coalition and Iraqi military operations have secured a neighborhood or district, a structure of Iraqi security forces sufficient to maintain the peace is expected to be left in place and reinforced with the capacity to undertake civic action and foster economic revitalization. This will be supported with $500 million in funds from Prime Minister Maliki's government and at least $130 million of U.S. funds.
These economic support funds will be used to offer vocational training and create jobs, especially for 17-to-25-year-old males; to foster public support through improved services, such as medical care and trash and debris removal; and to build local governmental capacity to protect and provide for their citizens. These goals will be achieved through a mixture of high-impact, short-term programs; mid-term programs designed to stabilize these initial gains; and programs focused on long-term economic development. Prime Minister Maliki's plan for securing Baghdad is also closely tied to the national unity government's larger program for reconciliation, which seeks to foster political understanding between Sunni and Shiite forces, including those that either control or influence unauthorized armed groups involved in sectarian conflict.
In addition, a moral compact between the religious leaders of the two Islamic communities -- which will ban sectarian killings -- will delegitimize the violence. Such a compact would deny the killers a political or religious sanctuary while Iraqi and Coalition forces deny them physical shelter. For the longer term, the plan seeks to induce insurgents and militias to lay down their arms by implementing a program to demobilize unauthorized armed groups. It will also review the implementation of the de-Baathification process -- referring those accused of crimes to the judiciary and reconciling with the rest.
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It is understandable that when the American people hear of new U.S. casualties and witness the images of bloodshed from the streets of Baghdad, they conclude that our plans for stemming sectarian violence in Iraq have failed. Yet, implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan has only recently begun. Iraq's national unity government has been in office barely three months, and its ministers of defense and interior have been on the job for less than 80 days. Iraqi ministers are still hiring key staff, and they are learning to work together, under the leadership of a new prime minister. The Committee for National Dialogue and Reconciliation, charged with overseeing implementation of the reconciliation plan, was formed only three weeks ago.
Moreover, as tragic and dangerous as the ongoing violence is to our shared vision of a free and prosperous Iraq, it is not representative of the Iraqi people's sentiments toward one another. In July, a poll by the International Republican Institute, a nonpartisan organization dedicated to democracy promotion, found that 94% of Iraqis said they support a "unity" government representing all sects and ethnic communities, with only 2% opposed. Some 78% of Iraqis opposed Iraq being segregated by religion or ethnicity, with only 13% in favor. Even in Baghdad, where the worst of Iraq's sectarian violence has occurred, 76% of those surveyed opposed ethnic separation, with only 10% favoring it. The challenge of the Baghdad Security Plan and its accompanying effort at national reconciliation is to realize the overwhelming majority of Iraqis desire to live in peace with one another against the violent minority who seek to impose their vision of hatred and oppression.
These programs are already beginning to show positive results. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense reports that the crime rate in Doura has been reduced by 80%. In the Rashid district, Sunni and Shiite political leaders, tribal leaders and imams met and signed an agreement forswearing violence. The tribal leaders went a step further by renouncing protection for tribal members who engage in sectarian violence.
Although it is too early to determine whether these success stories will be replicated throughout the city, this initial progress should give Iraqis, as well as Americans, hope about the future. Contrary to those who portray Iraq as hopelessly mired in ancient ethnic and sectarian feuds, Iraqis themselves want to put the divisions of the past behind them. The Battle of Baghdad will determine the future of Iraq, which will itself go a long way to determining the future of the world's most vital region. Although much difficult work still remains to be done, it is imperative that we give the Iraqis the time and material support necessary to see this plan through, and to win the Battle of Baghdad.
Mr. Khalilzad is the U.S. ambassador to Iraq.
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