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mobileone

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  1. an operation............ http://www.wjwireless.com/index.php
  2. one more tajer.. http://www.locustworld.com/modules.php?op=...&artid=1&page=1
  3. tajer, good luck with this venture here's vsat link you may or may not have........... GVF I'm just reading about it now.....but could you use that system, economically, for your ISP's upload backbone, then build out to subscribers with, the 802.11 technology in a mesh, as per........ http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/59/28972.html http://www.kingsbridgelink.co.uk/ http://www.communitywireless.org/ http://www.linuxdevices.com/articles/AT5073214560.html http://www.newswireless.net/ what kind of costs can the typical consumer bear in your area (subscription and hardware), how disperse is the area in km?
  4. baghda even better, Become a wireless ISP: for £300 the home of Guy Kewney's Mobile Campaign
  5. baghda some wireless ISP info It was designed to facilitate information dissemination about Rural WISPs as a compelling solution for rural broadband service.
  6. some info i found on the paris club.......... Anyway, the defining characteristic of Paris Club workouts is that they are slooooow. There are a number of reasons for this; the chief one is obviously that there is no urgency on the part of the creditors because it isn’t their crisis, but there are also institutional constraints. To understand the institutional constraints, it’s worth taking a look at the Paris Club principles There’s five of them: 1) Debts are dealt with on a case-by-case basis, dependent on the individual circumstances of each debtor 2) The Paris Club works by consensus; no decision is taken unless there is unanimous agreement 3) Debts are only rescheduled given sufficient conditionality on domestic policy to ensure that the restructuring actually improves the prospects of the debtor. This usually means an IMF program. 4) Sounds obvious but isn’t; there is a principle of solidarity which ensures that members agree to actually implement the decisions of their Club representatives. 5) The Paris club has a comparable treatment principle; it only works on the basis that the debtor will not give any creditors a better deal than it agreed with the Paris Club. This is in order to ensure that the money put in by government creditors doesn’t just go straight out the door to some other class of creditor. There are lots of other rules and conventions but these are the important ones. Of these, number 1 is a good thing; there are no hard and fast rules to get things stuck on a technicality, and it is considered bad form to make decisions based on possible precedent-setting. Number 4 is a good thing because its practical impact is that the people round the table in Paris actually have the power to get things done; there’s no dicky ratification process back home (democracy shmemocracy). Number 3 is a real pain in the arse because a) it ties countries into IMF programs which are often really badly designed for their purpose and it gives the IMF more negotiating leverage, because the IMF can hold out the prospect of scuppering the Paris Club talks in order to get a bit more cooperation. Numbers 2 and 5 are the main reason that things take forever. The permanent members of the Paris Club are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finaland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia[1], Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Brits and the USA. Try getting unanimous agreement out of that little lot in a hurry. Furthermore, the debtor for its own part has a dicey game in negotiating because it knows that principle 5 means that the Paris Club agreement sets the tone for the whole debt workout; if you get the Paris Club terms wrong in either direction, it means that you’re going to end up with an unworkable debt reduction proposal and go back to square one. Principle 5 also makes the specific case of Iraq more complicated because it’s not just a matter of James Baker going round the world saying come on you stingy bastards and Chirac saying oh go on then. Now that the debt’s entered the Paris Club process, it’s no longer really an option for France or Germany to unilaterally forgive a chunk of debt (that’s presumably why they did it). The Paris Club is a good process for making sure that the eventual restructuring is a genuinely workable plan, and for minimising free-riding by creditors, but it’s more or less completely incompatible with the piecemeal, quick-win style approach which Baker appears to be taking. Le Club De Paris
  7. Woody and salim, I apologize for the length of those articles, I'm not sure how many reading this thread need translation. two of my considerations are (and to an extent they agree with some of Layth's points.) why do foreign cooperations need to come into Iraq and take over services and industries, that in the past Iraqis themselves were able to run? will the Iraqi people be able to organize into unions, if they want to, without obstruction from the old regime's law? here's a link discussing parallels between Germany and Iraq rebuilding...... Fixing Germany Wasn't Easy Either unfortunately it's in English, but the replies are very interesting woody I have read articles about the sponsoring of unionism in post war Germany and Japan.....but for now give me time to find them salim are there any problems maintaining this site? is there a need for funding?
  8. washingtonpost.com In Iraq, an Ayatollah We Shouldn't Ignore By Robin Wright Sunday, December 14, 2003; Page B03 A quarter-century ago, the United States misread the power and legitimacy of a Shiite ayatollah -- and ended up "losing" Iran, then one of two pillars of American policy in the Middle East. The impact is felt to this day. Could Washington be on the verge of making the same mistake in Iraq in a way that could also compromise, even betray, the very democratic process that the Bush administration has begun to demand for the entire region? The problem stems from the game of chicken the United States is playing with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani over the future of Iraq. The cleric, the most powerful leader in Iraq since Saddam Hussein was toppled, wants elections for a government that will assume control when the American occupation ends on July 1. But the United States, still smarting from its encounter with Ayatollah Khomeini after Iran's 1979 revolution, has a bad case of ayatollah-itis. Policy-think is shaped by an unspoken fear: Beware Shia-istan. So the administration is balking at popular elections. It has lots of reasonable arguments: There's not enough time for voter registration, party formation and a campaign. There's too much violence and security is uneven, especially in Sunni strongholds. Saddam and his aides are still at large. Any election would be flawed. Washington also fears the precedent of ceding to an ayatollah -- even over the issue of a popular vote -- and further alienating Sunnis, both in Iraq and in oil-rich or strategic neighboring countries. To transfer power, L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of the U.S.-led authority that governs Iraq, has instead devised an indirect system to choose a new Iraqi government through 18 regional caucuses. It's so complicated, however, that even some U.S. officials refer to cheat sheets to explain the different phases that begin in early January with selection of coordinating committees, continue in February with a prolonged caucus process and wrap up with selection of members for a new national assembly in May. Those Iraqis would then pick a new government in June. Not until the following year would the Iraqi people vote in a popular election. As now envisioned, the process orchestrated by Bremer is also weighted in favor of former exiles and the aging opposition leaders who were handpicked by the United States to be members of the Iraqi Governing Council and who have been unable to provide inspiring or popular leadership. Many Iraqis have said they are suspicious of the outcome of the political transition before it has even begun. Some officials in Washington who are involved in implementing the Iraq policy aren't all that confident that the current exit strategy will work either. They have said privately that they worry that the plan will gradually unravel: Key Iraqis will either opt out of participating in committees and caucuses, or will decide down the road that the new government has no more legitimacy than the current U.S.-selected council. The stakes during this pivotal period involve more than who ends up ruling in Baghdad. Sistani has come to represent the dilemma that the United States will face repeatedly in the Middle East in the years ahead: When should we encourage and facilitate elections in countries with large Muslim populations? Over the next seven months, Iraq will be the test case for American credibility, since President Bush, in two eloquent speeches last month -- in Washington and London -- pledged that the United States will no longer compromise on democratic principles in the 22 Arab nations because of economic or diplomatic ties. Iraq's Shiite majority already has its doubts as a result of two American missteps in Najaf, one of the two holiest sites in Shiite Islam and Sistani's home base. After the United States occupied the country, it alienated Shiites by appointing a former colonel in Saddam's army -- and a Sunni Muslim -- as mayor of Najaf. Intensely unpopular, Abul Munim Abud was arrested by coalition forces three months later at the request of an Iraqi judge. Charged with kidnapping three children of a political opponent, misuse of government accounts, corruption and misuse of power, he was sentenced by an Iraqi court to 14 years in prison. More importantly, Iraq's first free local elections were due to be held in Najaf last June. The U.S. military had conducted a voter registration drive and built ballot boxes, while 18 candidates had festooned the streets with colorful posters declaring their positions. Then Bremer overruled the local U.S. military commander and abruptly canceled the election. Publicly, the occupation authority said conditions were not suitable for a vote, although U.S. officials privately said it had been canceled in part because they were concerned about the outcome. Najaf is a microcosm of the awkward choice that the U.S. occupation continues to face in Iraq: allow real elections and accept the result, or orchestrate the process so that it leaves behind a friendly government, which may or may not endure. Whatever our fears or past experience elsewhere with the Shiite clergy, and whatever the possible risk, the greater risk may be in not building a bridge to Sistani. The reclusive ayatollah is probably the person the United States needs to cultivate most at this vital political juncture. Some of the Governing Council's 24 members have appealed to the 73-year-old Sistani for support, but he has so far resisted. As the senior cleric for Iraq's largest power bloc, he is more influential than any of them. He is also the closest thing Iraq has to an elected leader. Shiite clerics gain status because followers voluntarily support them and provide funds that in turn empower them to act on behalf of the community. Unlike their Sunni counterparts, they have more authority over the faithful because they are empowered to interpret God's word, while Sunnis clerics act more as spiritual advisers. The distinction, very roughly, is comparable to the difference between the power and influence of Catholic and Protestant clerics. Sistani already proved his willingness to work with the United States when he indirectly bestowed legitimacy on the U.S. invasion and occupation. Even when he urged elections, he did not call for any public demonstrations to back him up -- as Khomeini did to support his fatwas in Iran. Among Shiites, Sistani is also modest politically. He is hardly an advocate of liberal Western-style democracy but he does believe that the popular will should prevail. He has long advocated separation of politics and religion. A practitioner of the so-called "quietist" branch of Islam, he wants fellow clerics to stay out of government. Sistani does want Iraq's new constitution to be compatible with Islam, a position adopted by allies from Egypt to Pakistan that will nonetheless make Washington nervous. He does not, however, favor the brand of militant Khomeini-ism that, Iraq analysts warn, has spread throughout Shiite-dominated southern Iraq largely undetected over the past dozen years. The radicalization of Iraq's Shiites has increased particularly since Saddam's sweeping crackdown against their 1991 uprising -- an event inspired by former President Bush when he called for Iraqis to topple their leader after the first Persian Gulf War. Today, at least a third of Iraq's roughly 15 million Shiites are Khomeini-ist, estimates Juan Cole, a University of Michigan expert who has studied Iraq's Shiites for two decades. Wary or disillusioned with other systems, they favor a theocratic state with a trusted religious leader at the top, which is not an idea Sistani favors. This could well be a moment for the United States to seize -- and stem a burgeoning tide of radicalism. Significant numbers of Shiites still favor secular rule, as do vast numbers of Sunnis and Kurds. Together they constitute a majority. In the tumultuous decades since Iran's revolution, Muslims in the Middle East have generally become cynical about the failure of Iran's ayatollahs to create a viable government of God. That has led to widespread rejection of theocracy across the Middle East, with many Arabs fearing religious rulers just as much as Western governments do. The most effective way to foster a legitimate and secular government is through popular elections -- now, not in 2005, when too many of America's good intentions may already have unraveled. The notion of a popular vote is gaining momentum. In Hilla last week, protesters demanded a local governor be elected, not appointed. They said they were inspired in part by Sistani. There are no easy answers. Yet direct elections, however imperfect, may be preferable to waiting. "We've got to allow, encourage and facilitate Iraqis to grapple with their own future," said one U.S. official recently, "and quit trying to do it for them." To ensure that Iraqis feel they are fully invested in their country, many Iraq experts and even some U.S. officials warn that Washington is going to have to compromise further on its exit strategy -- before it is too late to implement it effectively. Author's e-mail: wrightr@washpost.com
  9. UN ruling on polls urged Published: 13 December 2003 BAGHDAD: Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, Iraq's highest-ranking Shi'ite cleric, wants the United Nations to rule if early elections can take place in the country, in a new embarrassment to the US occupation authorities. Washington, which has decreed a lengthy delay before proper elections are held in 2005, can ill-afford to snub the religious leader of Iraq's majority community. "Ayatollah Sistani maintains his call for elections in Iraq unless a neutral UN committee, appointed by Secretary General Kofi Annan, visits Iraq and reaches the conclusion that in the current circumstances it is technically and politically impossible to hold general elections," said interim Governing Council member Muwaffak Al Rubaie. He met the Shi'ite leader, who along with three other ayatollahs make up the Shi'ites' supreme religious authority, at his power base in the holy city of Najaf. The Governing Council signed a November 15 agreement with the US-led coalition to transfer sovereignty to a transitional national assembly by May 31 next year. General elections would not take place until March 2005, a date Al Sistani has rejected as far too late. The deal gave no role at all to the UN, but stipulates that the transitional assembly will be made up of notables elected by a 15-member committee. Five of the committee would be appointed by the Governing Council, the rest by provincial assemblies. Several Shi'ite figures demanded the world body be brought into the process. Governing Council member Mohammad Bahr Al Olum urged that the written agreement give the transitional government the right to call on the assistance of the UN or a country of its choice. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- © Gulf Daily News
  10. Airedale What browser are you using, and what is your screen resolution set at? the site sizes fine for me even with the favorites bar on. mb1 screen res 1280X1024 browser IE6
  11. I hope Baker has a chance to talk with the folks at Jubilee Iraq as they have also been working on the issue of Iraq's debt
  12. baghda I feel your pain about not having reliable Internet. If there are 802 wireless networks around where you live, and you know a tech that reads english, this may be worth reading.... " Cantenna " - yagi design for 802.11b wireless application are you, yourself working now? good luck brother
  13. salim that is good news to hear, so is it safe to assume that the Baathists were getting paid better then she "back in the day". also I found reference to to better pay here.... Life in battened-down Baghdad :Self-preservation U.S. soldiers' goal The new normal, in Baghdad at least, includes a measurably greater affluence — government salaries for everyone from street sweepers to school teachers are up significantly over Saddam-era rates, and signs of what is now the most freewheeling economy in the Arab world abound. An estimated 250,000 cars have been added to Iraqi streets, imported duty-free at bargain rates and fitted with black licence plates to denote that someday, when a real Iraqi government emerges, they'll be subject to proper registration. but as baghda reports The grocery prices to 3 to 4 times, also for propane and kerosene, you need to go through a very long queue to get gas. so inflation is becoming a factor.
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