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Alchalabi أحمد الجلبي

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http://www.sotaliraq.com/newiraq/article_2...06_21_5114.html

 

http://www.sotaliraq.com/newiraq/article_2...06_22_4030.html

 

The third and fourth part of the long interview with Chalabi.. In Arabic..

i am so surprised that this was not translated to english.. It is very intersting story about the American plans for removing Saddam

Could someone translate it to english? And then maybe sell the translation to some english-speaking media, and then post a link to it?

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JThomas

Fully agree. Indeed , after reading it, I found it a very important and critical information..

I am sending the request to some friends ..

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http://www.sotaliraq.com/newiraq/article_2...06_23_4607.html

 

In Arabic.. Part 5 of Alchalabi interview in Al Qabas newspaper

> يقال أن علاقتك قوية معه؟

 

- بالعكس، أنا أول ما سمعت به قلت: أين غارنر؟ لماذا هو في الكويت ولا يأتي الى العراق؟ في ذاك الوقت حزن رامسفيلد واتصل وقال لماذا تتكلم هكذا عن غارنر.

 

> أنك تحدثت عن غارنر قبل أن يصير غارنر؟

 

- رفضت غارنر ورفضت أي عسكري وطالبت بحكومة موقتة.

 

> هذه مطالبكم من أيام مؤتمر فيينا.

 

- نعم، وبعدها تصاعدت المطالبة، ففي البداية المعارضة العراقية لم توافق على الحكومة الموقتة. ولكن في اجتماع صلاح الدين وافقوا. كنا دائما ضد الاحتلال ومع تشكيل حكومة موقتة.

 

 

أصدقاء واعداء

 

> أصدقاؤكم كانوا رموز الادارة الاميركية مثل وولفويتز وريتشارد بيرل ويعيبون عليكم الآن هذه الصداقة في وقت تتفاخر به حكومات عربية وأجنبية وحتى أطراف المعارضة، بهذه الصداقة؟

 

- هذه الاتهامات أصبحت تافهة الآن، فالاميركان لديهم 200 ألف جندي في العراق حاليا وقاموا باسقاط نظام صدام والأطراف التي كانت تتكلم ضد الاميركان في المعارضة وغيرها، هي أكثر الأطراف التي لديها علاقات طيبة معهم الآن. لا يستطيعون الآن قول أي شيء، فكل طرف يشارك بالعملية السياسية في العراق كان من الصعب عليه القيام بأي نشاط سياسي في الداخل، القضية الآن اختلفت، وتنحصر في كيفية استلام العراقيين السيادة وخروج الاميركان من العراق وعدم ممارسة نفوذ غير طبيعي وسري على الحكومة العراقية بعد استلام السيادة. هذا أهم أمر مطروح الآن. موقفي منذ البداية ضد أن يكون هناك احتلال، خطتنا كانت تشكيل حكومة موقتة حليفة مع الاميركان في الحرب ضد صدام.

 

> طرحت ثلاثة سيناريوهات وقت مطالبتكم المذكورة: إما يدخل الاميركان لوحدهم في المعركة، أو يدخلونها بالاشتراك معكم، أو تدخلها المعارضة لوحدها، غير أنهم فضلوا السيناريو الأول، فلكل سيناريو تبعاته كما تعلم.

 

- نعم. فضلوا هذا السيناريو بعد أن رأوا أن القيادة المركزية من الصعب عليها القيام بعمليات عسكرية واسعة النطاق غير مسيطر تماما عليها من قبلهم.

 

> هل السبب فني وغير سياسي؟

 

- هذا جزء منه في شقه العسكري، لا يقدرون من دون سيطرتهم المباشرة على مجريات الأمور الحربية. بالنسبة للشق السياسي، يعيدنا الى موضوع نظام الأمن العربي الذي حدثتك عنه، فالاميركان لديهم عنصر رئيسي في المنظومة الأمنية للشرق الأوسط وهو الاعتماد على الدول العربية التي حدثتك عنها. فمثلا، جزء أساسي من النظام الأمني الاميركي، هو هذا التعاون العسكري الأمني القائم بين الأردن واسرائيل ومصر. هذا حجر زاوية عندهم، ويحاولون أن يضيفوا اليه السلطة الفلسطينية عن طريق محمد دحلان وجهاز الأمن الوقائي الفلسطيني الذي أسسه في السابق جبريل الرجوب. هذا أحد أوجه التعاون المخابراتي - الاستخباراتي الموجود بين المخابرات الأردنية والموساد والمخابرات المصرية وهذا الأمن الوقائي الفلسطيني شيء كبير والأمور تسير على أن مصر ستأخذ مسؤولية غزة من اسرائيل وانسحاب اسرائيل منها بتأمين مصر للأمن فيها بالتعاون مع الأطراف المذكورة. في ظل هذا الاطار، وأقصد التعاون الجاري منذ زمن، كان اسقاط النظام وتدمير صدام ومؤسساته التي كانت تتعامل وتتعاون مع كل هذه الأطراف هذا شيء كبير عليهم. لأن العراق الآن خال من الأجهزة التي يمكن أن تكون طرفا في هذا التعامل والشعب العراقي لا يقبل، ثمة حالة متسارعة من محاولات السي آي ايه والأطراف الأمنية الاميركية المعتمدة على هذا التصور، بغية انشاء أجهزة تستطيع التعامل مع العراق، بشكل تسيطر على الوضع فيه، وفي الوقت نفسه تكون طرفا في هذا التحالف والتعاون الأمني - الاستخباري - العسكري الموجود في المنطقة، الذي هو برعاية الاميركان.

الحلقة السادسة غدا

 

القبس

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http://www.sotaliraq.com/newiraq/article_2...06_24_1747.html

 

Part 6 of the interview with Alchalabi

يبدو أن الحرب اشتعلت بين الطوائف الثلاث التي تسيطر على العراق الآن ولا أقصد بهم السنة والشيعة والاكراد، بل البنتاغون والخارجية والسي آي ايه، وعلى الأرجح ساهمت بشكل ما في اندلاع شرارة هذه الحرب.. ما رأيك؟

 

- نعم بالطبع، والضربة الكبيرة حدثت في ابو غريب. > من سببها؟ السي آي إيه؟

 

- لا أعرف من سببها، لكنه بالتأكيد سوء تصرفهم. ما حصل في أبي غريب مستنكر ومدان في كل الأشكال، كان ينبغي أن يدمروا هذا السجن منذ البداية وألا يتركوا سجنا كهذا في العراق الحر. هذا السجن شيء رهيب.

 

> من يسيطر عليه؟

 

- استخبارات الجيش.

 

> هل ما شاهدناه يعتبر من أساليبهم؟.

 

- لا أعرف أساليبهم، لكن المسؤولين هم ضباط في الاستخبارات العسكرية.

 

> ما علاقتك بالاستخبارات العسكرية؟.

 

- لا توجد لدي علاقة معهم.

 

كراهية الوكالة

 

>لماذا تكرهك السي آي إيه؟

 

- شرحت لك كيف كشفت فشلهم.

 

> وضعك معهم ألا يتطبـع بعد 15 يونيو (مغادرة تينيت مكتبه بشكل رسمي-ج)؟

 

- كلا، عدة مرات حاولوا تعديل الوضع معي، يتصلون ويأتون لكنهم لا يقدرون. تينيت كان يقف ضد هذه المحاولات وثمة أناس آخرون أيضا. الآن لا أعرف ما الذي سيحدث في هذا المسار، لكنني في الحقيقة ضد التعاون السري، نريد تعاونا واضحا بين العراق وأميركا.

 

> يقال إن «عرب الخارجية» يكرهونك لأنهم يفضلون سنيا لقيادة العراق ولم تخف هذه الرغبة دول جوار أيضا بالرغم من ارادة الشيعة والكرد في العراق!

 

- طبعا وحاولوا وهذه الدعوات التي انطلقت من الملك عبد الله بضرورة تسليم الرئاسة لضابط بطل في حرب قادسية صدام، لكن هذا الأمر لا يمشي في العراق أبدا.

 

> البنتاغون يختلف عنهم في رغبته في «اقامة عراق ديمقراطي» لقطع مصادر الارهاب في الشرق الأوسط، ووجد الاستراتيجيون في البنتاغون أهمية لعلاقاتكم مع ايران وفائدة للولايات المتحدة في هذا الصدد على الأقل واعترف الجنرال مايرز بأن المعلومات الاستخبارية التي زودتهم بها «قد انقذت حياة الجنود»، فهل يعتقد البنتاغون بأنك أنقذت جنودهم فيما ترى السي آي ايه أنك عرضت حياتهم للخطر؟ ما هذه المفارقة؟

 

- المفارقة تنحصر في أن السي آي ايه وتينيت كانوا يقولون هذا الكلام لتبرير فشلهم والذي جعل التعاون معنا مع أي طرف أميركي صعبا.

 

> ما أكبر فشل أميركي للسي آي ايه في العراق؟

 

- أكبر فشل هو عدم قابليتهم على اسقاط صدام لفترة 13 سنة، هذا فشل كبير. ثانيا، عدم كشفهم لأسلحة الدمار الشامل في العراق ويعد فشلا كبيرا آخر. ثالثا، عدم استطاعتهم حتى الآن كشف شبكات الارهاب ويعتبر فشلا كبيرا اضافيا.

 

> هذه مسؤوليتهم المباشرة؟

 

- طبعا، هم الجهاز الاستخباري المسؤول عن هذه المسائل.

 

> هل لا تزال علاقاتكم مع سلطة الائتلاف التي بقي لها 18 يوما (اللقاء الحالي جرى في 13 يونيو) على توترها واتصالاتكم معهم مقطوعة؟

 

- نعم بقي لهم 18 يوما فقط. العلاقة الآن غير موجودة ومقطوعة تماما.

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http://www.sotaliraq.com/newiraq/article_2...06_25_0842.html

 

 

 

Part 7 of the chalabi interview.. UN officials involvement in Saddam robbery of Oil money

 

 

فضيحة النفط

 

> تبنى مجلس الحكم أكبر عملية لم يكن المجلس بقادر على تبنيها وهي التحقيق في تورط الأمم المتحدة في رشاوى الخمسة بلايين دولار من النفط مقابل الغذاء الذي وصل ولم يصل وكلفتم محامين لهذا الغرض؟

 

- مجلس الحكم تبنى هذه القضية.

 

> هل كان المجلس بقادر على تبني هكذا قضية كبيرة؟

 

- طبعا يقدر، لماذا لا يقدر؟ تبناها وبريمر شكر مجلس الحكم. وجلبنا مدققين وليس محامين كما ذكرت، مدققين من شركةKpmg وهي أحسن شركة تعمل في هذا المجال في العالم.

 

> أنت الذي شعلها؟

 

- نعم، والذي حدث أنني كتبت رسالة.

 

> وإلى أي شيء استندت على وجود فضيحة؟

 

- أعرفها منذ حصولها وبناء على معلومات في السابق أعلم بها من خارج العراق.

 

> .. وأطنان الوثائق التي بحوزتك، ألا تشير الى الفضيحة؟

 

- فيها، طبعا موجود فيها. لكني أعرف قبل الوثائق المحلية.

 

> هل كان المدير السابق لبرنامج النفط مقابل الغذاء في العراق بنسون سيفان وديليت ناير رئيس مكتب خدمات المراقبة الداخلية يد بتسديد مبالغ اضافية خارج البرنامج لتذهب هذه الأموال لجيوب موردين أميركان وفرنسيين وغيرهم؟ هل هذه هي الفضيحة؟ وما هي الفضيحة في الحقيقة؟

 

- توجد الكثير من المخالفات الفظيعة، أولها، استخدام صدام لمبيعات النفط لأطراف ليس لها علاقة بالنفط للرشوة و شراء النفوذ السياسي عن طريق المال.

 

> كان صدام يفعل ذلك عن طريق النفط المهرب؟

 

- لا، ليس فقط في التهريب، بل في «النفط مقابل الغذاء». هذه تعتبر مخالفة كبيرة لقرار مجلس الأمن. ثانيا، الأولى عملها، كيف عملها، أنه كان يمنح موظفي الأمم المتحدة رشاوى المشرفين على هذا البرنامج.

 

> هؤلاء الذين ذكرتهم؟

 

- أنا لا أذكر أسماء. ولا أتحدث عن أسماء ولم أذكر اسم أي شخص. ثالثا، كان صدام يفرض، من خلال المشتريات، على الشركات المجهزة زيادة القيمة 10 % تدفع له نقدا. هذه كلها موثقة. والشيء الآخر كان صدام يزيد على شحنات النفط، شحنات اضافية بالتواطؤ مع موظفي الأمم المتحدة ويأخذ ثمنها ويودع الأموال في حسابات بأسماء أشخاص في البنوك الأردنية.

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http://www.sotaliraq.com/newiraq/article_2...06_26_1258.html

 

Part 8 of the interview..

That is the most interesting one.. Talking about the alleged Iranian code.. and some very sensative finnancial issues!!

 

 

أنت لم تقصر، مضيت قدما ولم تستسلم وظهرت في التلفزيون وطلبت مواجهة جورج تينيت في الكونغرس تحت القسم، ماذا كنت تريد قوله «تحت القسم»؟

 

- طلبوا مني عدم التكلم في الاعلام الاميركي، لكني لم أرد عليهم. أما بخصوص الكونغرس، فليجلب معلوماته، ألم يتهمنا بأننا أعطينا أسراره الى ايران، قلت له: أجلب معلوماتك، وأنا أجلب معلوماتي، ولنستعرض ما قمت به في العراق منذ أن استلمت المسؤولية حتى الآن.

 

شيفرة ايران

 

> فلنتكلم عن حكاية الشيفرة الايرانية؟

 

- لم نكشف أي شيفرة، لا يوجد شيء من هذا القبيل. كلام وتأليف سخيف.

 

> هل تعرف خليل النعيمي؟

 

- أي نعيمي؟

 

> الدبلوماسي الايراني الذي قتل في بغداد.

 

- هذا مترجم، يستعملونه كمترجم لانه يعرف العربية، ولا أعتقد أنه ضابط استخبارات ولا أي هيئة أمنية، كان يأتي مع السفير الايراني الى هنا، وكان السفير الايراني يذهب عند كل الناس ويترجم له، والسفير الايراني زار كل الأطراف، ولا أعتقد أن له دورا معينا. عمي هذا تأليف كامل، لو ترى الطريقة التي عرضوا بها الأمر: كشفنا الشيفرة، الايرانيون بنفس الشفرة بعثوا خبرا يقول بأن الشيفرة مكشوفة. هل هذا معقول؟ الاميركان ذكروا أنهم أجروا امتحانا ذكروا بالشيفرة أنهم وجدوا مستودع أسلحة عندهم. الاميركان قرأوا ولم يفعلوا شيئا، فهذا يعني أن الايرانيين اطمأنوا إلى أن شيفرتهم غير مكشوفة.. لماذا أنت يا أميركا تعلنين عن كشف الشيفرة؟! أي واحد يفهم أبجدية الاستخبارات يدرك أن هذا الادعاء تافه وسخيف. ثم من يقول بأن الايرانيين لا يريدون توتير العلاقة بيني وبين أميركا ويعملون مثل هذه الأمور؟ لا يوجد سبب ولا أي ربط أن تعلن دولة هذا الأمر بالصحف، الا لغرض الضرر بالطرف الآخر الذي هو أنا. وسبب آخر، لو كان صحيحا، لما أعلنته الدولة. جوهر المسألة هو اختلاق الشيء لسبب سياسي ضدي، أنا أصبحت كما يقولون أقوض سياستهم في العراق! يعني هل أنا أصبحت اليد الطويلة ذات التأثير؟

 

> «أتركوا شعبي حرا يدير شؤونه» ودعوتكم لسيادة كاملة غير منقوصة وتشددكم لاجراء الانتخابات واعتراضكم على القرار 1483 وأول من اعترض على تعيين حاكم مدني وأول من ظهر في التلفزيون وكشف الفضائح المالية وطالب بسيطرة العراقيين على النفط ومواردهم وثرواتهم، أرى أن لديهم أسسا لشعورهم بمضايقتكم لهم وتقويض سياستهم؟

 

- نعم، طيب.. هم يتعاملون مع شخص يقول انه يريد اقامة علاقات طبيعية وطيبة معهم وممتنون لبوش لأنه ساعدنا على اسقاط صدام وتحرير العراق، ونطمح إلى علاقات مميزة مع أميركا والذي لا يريد سيطرة أميركية سرية على العراق يعتبر عدوا لأميركا. قد يكون عدوا للاستخبارات.

 

> تستغل أخطاء الثلاثي بريمر - الابراهيمي - بلاكويل لتكتسب الشعبية للمعادين لأميركا! وحتى المداهمة صبت لصالحكم شعبيا؟

 

- أنا غير زعلان، أعطوني جائزة.

 

الخطة السرية

 

> لماذا يصر الاميركان برأيك على عمل المستشارين في الوزارات؟

 

- انظر، ما الخطة الاميركية، وخطة الاستخبارات للسيطرة على العراق؟

 

> لا أعرف عنها شيئا!

 

- أول شيء بريمر خلق هيئات مستقلة عن أي طرف وليس لها علاقة بالحكومة..

 

> لمن تتبع؟

 

- غير تابعة لأحد.

 

> يعني تديرها حكومة المريخ!

 

- على هذا النحو، لا تتبع لأحد، عينها لمدة خمس سنوات وهي: هيئة النزاهة العامة، الهيئة الاعلامية، محكمة الجنايات الكبرى وهي خارج النظام القضائي العراقي.

 

> هذه تابعة للمطار؟

 

- لا نعرف لمن تتبع، هنالك أيضا تعيينه للمحافظين ومديري الشرطة لخمس سنوات ولا يجوز اسقاطهم، المحافظون ينبغي أن ينتخبوا مع مديري الشرطة بعد انتهاء الانتخابات.

 

> بما يشبه دولة داخل الدولة؟

 

- أسمع، عين مفتشين عامين في الوزارات هو الذي عينهم خلق بذلك شبكة داخل الحكومة خارج سلطة الوزير والحكومة.

 

> هذه الأمور كانت في أيامكم عندما كنتم في مجلس الحكم ورواتبهم أعلى منكم بعشر مرات!

 

- صحيح، عمل الكثير من هذه الأمور. لنأخذ مثلا، محكمة الجنايات الكبرى، كل قاض فيها، حمايته فقط تكلف في الشهر 70 ألف دولار. يأتي بمحام جديد، يعينه مباشرة قاض من الصنف الأول رأسا، وهو في الصنف الرابع. ويعطيه صلاحيات لكي يأمره، هذا الذي اقترفه بريمر: في كل مكان لديك غطاء وفي الوزارات مفتشون، واذا يوجد مستشارون أميركان استمروا بادارة الائتلاف وسينتقلون الى برنامج السفارة الاميركية الكبيرة التي ستظهر، ومنهم في وزارة الداخلية واستخبارات الشرطة وفي الفروع الخاصة بالشرطة، هؤلاء سيبقون بصفة ما، لكن لديهم علاقة خاصة بهذه الهيئات والأجهزة التي خلقوها ويسيطرون على الدولة العراقية عن طريق هؤلاء والوزراء سيصبحون بأيديهم، لاسيما أن الاميركان لديهم بلايين الدولارات سيصرفونها بالمحافظات والمناطق الأخرى. هذه الطريقة للسيطرة على العراق بشكل سري. تكلمت عن هذه المسألة انزعجوا مني طبعا.

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http://www.sotaliraq.com/newiraq/article_2...06_27_2346.html

 

Part 9, the last one.. Talking about debaathfication and relation with Jordan.. The syrian support to the insurgence

 

 

 

السياسيون، ألم تعثروا على حل غير هذا؟

- منذ مجيء صدام انتهى البعث كحزب سياسي وأصبح أداة لتنفيذ الجرائم التي مارسها صدام ضد العراق والشعب العراقي وأصبح البعث بيدقا بيد هذه الطاحونة الدموية التي اسمها نظام صدام، لذلك فان البعثي قد يحمل نوايا حسنة ولا يضمر الشر ولكنه أصبح جزءا من حالة ونظام مجرم. وقلنا في قرار اجتثاث البعث، ان كل بعثي دون عضو فرقة لا أحد تعرض له ولا أحد سأله أو أخرجه من وظيفته الذين هم 90 % من البعث. والباقون (90 ألفا) مشمولون بالمساءلة. الذين يمكن اعادتهم هم أعضاء الفرق، أما يأخذون تقاعدا أو يحصلون على الاستئناف ويجري تساهل معهم في هذا الشأن. أما أعضاء الشعب فما فوق فهؤلاء لا يعادون. لا تنس، ثمة رد فعل سيىء على اعادتهم. فالبعثيون لا يزالون منظمين وشبكات الاتصال فيما بينهم ولديهم قابليات لتقويض النظام الحالي والعمل ضده واعادة سيطرتهم، هذا الأمر من الممكن حدوثه. بالنسبة لأعضاء الفرق ملزمون بعدم ممارسة أي نشاط سياسي بعد عودتهم. وفي بعض المحافظات رفضوا اعادتهم حتى لو توافق لجنة الاجتثاث على اعادتهم كمحافظة الديوانية التي كان محافظها وزير الدفاع الحالي حيث وصلتنا رسالة منه تقول ان مجلس المحافظة رفض دراسة أي موضوع يخص اعادة البعثيين.

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Guest Guest_tajer

I can't log to the engilish version of the interveiew.. Would you please posted down..

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Guest anoymous

Ask the people of iraq how they think about chalabee

then you will know the real answer how the iraqi people realy think about him

the iraqi people are the real judge they are who suffered always not anyone else

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Ask the people of iraq how they think about chalabee

 

 

Indeed it would be very interesting to have such a poll.. However, in some early one , more than six months ago, Dr. Chalabe came in the fourth place as the most accepted leader.

 

I think the comming election will tell more about it .. Anyhow, Chalabi is the one who strongly asent with Ayatoula Systani and keep pushing for the election, while his opponents, are keep calling for delaying it!

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Ask the people of iraq how they think about chalabee

 

 

Indeed it would be very interesting to have such a poll.. However, in some early one , more than six months ago, Dr. Chalabe came in the fourth place as the most accepted leader.

 

I think the comming election will tell more about it .. Anyhow, Chalabi is the one who strongly asent with Ayatoula Systani and keep pushing for the election, while his opponents, are keep calling for delaying it!

The elections committee may not let him run. No one can run for office who is connected to an illegal militia. And the only militia that are legal are those connected to IG members. Will they decide that Chalabi's militia is still legal?

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I can't log to the engilish version of  the interveiew.. Would you please posted down..

Here is a different one.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5045125/

 

Meet the Press (NBC News) - Sunday, May 23, 2004

 

MR. TIM RUSSERT:  Our issues this Sunday:  yet more pictures and new videos of prisoner abuse in Iraq.  Former Bush administration ally, Ahmad Chalabi, now denounces the U.S. occupation.

 

(Videotape):

 

MR. AHMAD CHALABI:  Let my people be free.

 

(End videotape)

 

But first, joining us from Baghdad is the man in the center of the storm, Ahmad Chalabi.  Mr. Chalabi, these were pictures in January.  There you are seated in the Congress right behind the first lady of the United States, and on Thanksgiving when George Bush went to Baghdad, there you are greeting him. And now this.  These are scenes Thursday when your compound in Baghdad was raided on allegations of sharing top secret information with the Iranian government which led to this headline in The Washington Post:  "U.S. Aids Raid on Home of Chalabi."  And now today, this Newsweek cover:  "Our Con Man In Iraq."  What has happened for you to fall in such a way?

 

MR. CHALABI:  First of all, the charges about giving classified information to Iran by me or by any INC officer are false, non-existent.  They are charges put out by George Tenet and his CIA to discredit us, and I want to go to Congress.  I'm prepared to go to Congress and testify under oath and expose all the information and the documents in our possession and let George Tenet come himself to Congress to testify and let Congress resolve this issue.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  It seems to be beyond George Tenet.  The Wall Street Journal put it this way:  "Recent intelligence, including communications intercepts, suggest Mr. Chalabi ... provided contacts in Tehran with details of U.S. security operations and political plans."

 

And this from Newsday:  "The Defense Intelligence Agency"--that's not the CIA, that's the DIA--"has concluded that U.S.-funded arm of Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress has been used for years by Iranian intelligence to pass disinformation to the United States and to collect highly sensitive American secrets, according to intelligence sources.  Iranian intelligence has been manipulating the United States through Chalabi by furnishing through his Information Collection Program information to provoke the United States into getting rid of Saddam Hussein."

 

There are intercepts...

 

MR. CHALABI:  Anyone who has intercepts who has any information, any documents, I am prepared to go and face all this in the United States Congress.  It is no good quoting unnamed sources to say that they have a case. These are allegations that are put forward and directed by the CIA.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Mr. Chalabi, have you not had extensive meetings and contacts with the Iranian government?

 

MR. CHALABI:  Indeed, we have had many meetings with the Iranian government, but we have passed no secret information, no classified documents to them from the United States because principally, we are allies of the United States and we do nothing to harm the United States.  Furthermore, we have not had any classified information given to us by the United States, nor have we had any classified briefings, nor have I seen any classified document from the United States.  And I believe none in the INC have done that either.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Let me show you how some of the papers here have reported this latest incident.  The New York Times:  "Mr. Chalabi, regarded by many Iraqis as an American stooge, seemed to relish his new role as a martyr ... moving away from the Americans as he has moved closer to the country's Shiite majority."

 

The Christian Science Monitor said there is rumors all over Baghdad that said this was all part of a constructed charade by you and American officials in order for you to position yourself as independent of America so that you can seek to obtain power in Iraq.

 

MR. CHALABI:  Well, you can see the quality of the information then.  Iraq is not Latin America.  It's not Honduras.  And I would say a piece of advice for Ambassador Negroponte.  If he thinks he comes here and provides diplomatic cover for the control of Iraq through covert operations, I think he would be sadly mistaken.  Iraq seeks to be a democratic country, and the majority of the people of Iraq will express their views in an election.  The process that is going on now in Iraq to select a government, the Brahimi, Bremer, Blackwell process will lead to a failure of the government after June 30.  I call on President Bush, who is still the most popular politician in Iraq, to convene a meeting of Iraqi leaders in Camp David to iron out this process and put in place a government for Iraq that is effective, representative, and can lead Iraq to elections next January.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Won't that be perceived as a puppet government of the United States?

 

MR. CHALABI:  Not at all.  Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, Mohammed Bahr Al-Uloum and others are not perceived by anyone as puppets of the United States.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Let me turn the U.S. taxpayers.  This was a report from Reuters.  "The United States paid Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress at least $33 million since March 2000, according to a congressional report made public on Thursday. ... U.S. officials this week said the Pentagon stopped funding the INC - it had been giving roughly $340,000 a month - with the final payment in May."

 

What did the U.S. taxpayers get for $33 million?

 

MR. CHALABI:  I refer you to the testimony of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Congress a few days ago.  General Myers said that the information provided by the INC saved American lives.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Then why--excuse me.

 

MR. CHALABI:  They saved American lives.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Then why did the Pentagon take you off the payroll?

 

MR. CHALABI:  We were never on the payroll of the Pentagon.  We had a cooperative program with the Pentagon and we contributed to it more than they did.  It was a prewartime program designed to fight Saddam Hussein.  With the movement toward sovereignty on June 30, it is inappropriate for a political party in Iraq to have relations of this nature with a foreign military organization.  This program should move to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.  It was terminated by mutual agreement to end on June 30, 2004, with the advent of sovereignty.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  We all remember when Secretary of State Colin Powell went to the United Nations and made the case against Saddam Hussein.  He was on this program last week and expressed grave concern about the quality of some of that information.  Here's an article from the Los Angeles Times.  "The Bush administration's prewar claims that Saddam Hussein had built a fleet of trucks and railroad cars to produce anthrax and other deadly germs were based chiefly on information from a now-discredited Iraqi defector code-named `Curveball'...

 

"U.S. officials never had direct access to the defector and didn't even know his real name until after the war.  ... U.N. weapons inspectors hypothesized that such trucks might exist.  ... They then asked former exile leader Ahmad Chalabi...to help search for intelligence supporting their theory.  Soon after, a young chemical engineer emerged in a German refugee camp and claimed that he had been hired out of Baghdad University to design and build biological warfare trucks for the Iraqi army. ...

 

"Only later...did the the CIA learn the defector was the brother of one of Chalabi's top aides, and begin to suspect that he might been coached to provide false information."

 

MR. CHALABI:  We don't know who "Curveball" is.  That is part of the charges. Let them bring their files.  I'm prepared to go to Congress.  I'm prepared to answer all these charges.  We are mystified by this information.  We are mystified by who this person is and who is he the brother of.  We've been looking very actively to find out, but we still have not found out.  Let them tell us who it is, and let them put those charges, and I'm prepared to go and answer them in Congress.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Mr. Chalabi, it's beyond the CIA and just George Tenet, as you suggest.  This is Whitley Bruner, who was the CIA agent who first contacted you:  "[Chalabi's] primary focus was to drag us into a war...He couldn't be trusted."

 

David Kay, the former U.N. chief weapons inspector:  "[Chalabi's] history is one, as a con man, quite frankly. ... It was a conscious campaign designed to get the U.S. militarily involved in the removal of Saddam.  ...Through fabricated information that indicated a weapons program that they did not have."

 

And this from Pat Lang, who headed up counterterrorism in the Middle East and Southeast Asia for eight years at the Defense Intelligence Agency:  "He's a fake, one of the greatest frauds ever perpetrated on the American people."

 

How can all these people be so wrong?

 

MR. CHALABI:  They are all wrong.  They are--this is part of the common wisdom that has grown in Washington, but it is baseless.  We provided--our focus was not weapons of mass destruction.  Our focus was the suffering of the Iraqi people and the liberation of Iraq.  It is no secret the Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998 under the Clinton administration, and Clinton signed it.  It was the object of United States national policy to have regime change in Iraq.  And President Bush came.  Through his leadership and courage, he implemented this law, and the Iraq Liberation Act was passed long before any of these allegations came out.  So they should go and criticize the United States Congress.  We did not drive the United States to war in Iraq.  We were seeking the liberation of our country, and the United States decided for its own security and strategic purposes to help the Iraqi people liberate themselves, and that is what happened.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  But, Mr. Chalabi, you did say in--and the public documents are very clear, that the United States would only need 30,000 troops in Iraq, that we would be greeted as liberators.  Some fellow exiles said we'd be given sweets and flowers on the streets and that you could take U.S. troops to where the weapons of mass destruction actually existed.  And when asked about that in February, this is what you told The London Daily Telegraph.  "We are heroes in error.  ...As far as we're concerned we've been entirely successful.  That tyrant Saddam is gone and the Americans are in Baghdad.  What was said before is not important."

 

What was said before is important because it was information you provided to U.S. officials and to the American people.

 

MR. CHALABI:  What was said before is very important.  This interview is false.  The reporter did not ask these questions and I did not say "heroes in error."  I never gave him an interview.  I was sitting in a room chatting. The issue here is this.  We believe that the United States came to liberate the Iraqi people, and I think the liberation was successful.  Very few American troops were needed to defeat Saddam and the Iraqi people greeted them.  If the Iraqi people had fought them, just think what would have happened in Baghdad considering what happened in Fallujah.  The resistance was non-existent.  They were greeted as liberators.  The liberation was successful.  The occupation has been a failure.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  You said the other day, "Let my people go free."  We here in the United States have paid a very big price for the liberation of Iraq.  Seven hundred and ninety-three brave men and women dead, 4,524 injured or wounded. And now you're saying, "Let my people go free, get out."  Is that gratitude?

 

MR. CHALABI:  I never said get out.  The Iraqi people are absolutely grateful to the U.S. soldiers, the brave young men and women, and we are sorry for every single casualty that happened in Iraq.  We are very sorry about that. We are grateful and we will continue to so, but what we mean by let my people go is that we want sovereignty as agreed with President Bush.  President Bush agreed to give Iraq sovereignty.  We are struggling every day to implement this promise in Iraq and we want arrangements to give Iraq control over its armed forces, over its finances.  We want advisers appointed by the CPA to go when the CPA is dissolved on June 30.  And we want to make it possible for the U.S. troops to go out of Iraq with the thanks of the Iraqi people after having liberated our country, and we also want to have a strategic relationship with the United States, favoring United States' interests in Iraq because we believe that this is also in the interest of Iraq.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  If the U.S. troops left Iraq, what would they leave behind?

 

MR. CHALABI:  I hope they would be leaving a democratically elected government in Iraq that is friendly to the United States and that will be a model for future governments in the Arab and Muslim world.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  What if the Iraqi people chose a theocracy, a fundamentalist Islamic extremist country?

 

MR. CHALABI:  I believe the Iraqi people have enough sense to choose a democratically elected government.  This is a hypothetical question that is not pertinent here.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Well, look what's next door in Iran.  Do you think that's a democracy?

 

MR. CHALABI:  Iran was not liberated by the U.S. troops.  The Iranians overthrew a regime, an oppressive regime that was friendly to the United States and the Iraqi people have learned from the experience of their neighbors very well.  They are very careful in what they want.  The Islamic parties in Iraq who are in the Governing Council also approved the transitional administrative law which gives freedom of faith to individuals in Iraq.  It gives a bill of rights which is far more advanced than any in the Middle East.  And that law was approved by the Islamic parties.  It is possible under that law for a Muslim to change his religion without being punished.  That is not the case in Egypt nor is it in Jordan.  It also gives freedom for Iraqis to recover their citizenship regardless of their religion or national origin, and that's a great step forward.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Finally, will you seek elective office?

 

MR. CHALABI:  No, I'm not a candidate for any government office.

 

MR. RUSSERT:  Ahmad Chalabi, we thank you very much for your views.

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Part 1

 

Chalabi, Shunted to Sidelines, Shares His Playbook for Iraq

Party Leader Emphasizes Elections, Shaking Off U.S. Tutelage

 

By Edward Cody

Washington Post Foreign Service

Wednesday, June 30, 2004; Page A12

 

BAGHDAD, June 29 -- Ahmed Chalabi smiled contentedly at the thought. L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator who ran Iraq like a viceroy for more than a year, was reduced to a hasty exit with a stealthy helicopter ride to the airport, seen off without fanfare by no one higher-ranking than a deputy prime minister.

 

"Bremer put his hand in his pocket and went to the airport ignominiously," Chalabi chortled Tuesday, the day after Bremer's departure. "And Dan Senor with him," he added, referring to Bremer's spokesman, who had denigrated Chalabi on television.

 

In essence, Chalabi was saying, Bremer is now gone, Senor is now gone and Ahmed Chalabi is not.

 

True, Chalabi has been disowned by the Pentagon and his other sponsors in Washington, the ones who not long ago were paying him for intelligence on weapons of mass destruction that seems to have been groundless. Thanks in part to Bremer, he also was excluded from the new government headed by his longtime rival from exile days, Ayad Allawi. And warrants or subpoenas have been issued for about 15 of his aides, including his intelligence chief, while sources in the United States, speaking anonymously, suggest he may have passed U.S. secrets to Iran. Chalabi, who was not charged, has denied any wrongdoing by himself or his associates.

 

Now, as the Bush administration's efforts in Iraq enter a new phase and many key Americans have departed, Chalabi remains.

 

The cunning and determination that served him during more than a decade of encouraging the United States into war against Saddam Hussein have not deserted him. From headquarters in Mansour, Baghdad's toniest neighborhood, the former exile leader, the former Washington protégé, the former Iraqi Governing Council member has taken to watching, waiting and laying closely held plans.

 

Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, which once drew funds from the CIA and the Pentagon, has not gained a high profile as a political force in Iraq, but neither have the other exile groups. The INC will participate as a political party in next January's elections, Chalabi said. But in a shirt-sleeves conversation at his expansive residence, the portly campaigner, 59, danced and jabbed relentlessly when asked about what is left of his own political ambitions.

 

When pressed, he cited a bit of wisdom attributed to Imam Ali, a 7th-century warrior who married a daughter of the prophet Muhammad and became a central figure of Shiite Islam: "He who seeks authority should not be given authority." In more modern terms, he said he was lying low because "people immediately ascribe to me aims and ambitions of achieving power."

 

Chalabi, a secular Shiite, has kept only a modest hand in public affairs since the Governing Council on which he served disbanded a month ago. He has helped organize the grand assembly convening next month to pick a quasi-legislature, and he meets regularly with the Shiite Caucus of Iraq's Shiite political leaders. But he is the only senior figure in the U.S.-backed exile movement whose group was frozen out of the new government by the Bush administration's political process.

 

Yet even from the sidelines, Chalabi said, he has clear ideas about what the Iraqi government should do -- ideas formed in years of maneuvering through the many agencies of the U.S. government. His ideas, forcefully expressed, have gotten him into trouble before, he acknowledged, generating hostility at the CIA, enraging Bremer and irritating even fellow members of the Governing Council.

 

The CIA had a long grudge against him, he said, because he warned that Iraqi intelligence had penetrated a 1996 coup plot supported by George J. Tenet, then deputy director of intelligence. Bremer turned against him because of his repeated insistence that Iraqis be given authority more swiftly to run their own country, Chalabi said.

 

It was Bremer, he said, who was behind the raid May 20 in which his office was searched for compromising documents on the strength of a warrant issued by an Iraqi judge. However, Senor, Bremer's spokesman, said at the time that Bremer's only connection with the case was administrative. "Ambassador Bremer doesn't intervene in these respective cases," Senor said then, "he just handles the procedural matter of referring it."

 

Now things have changed. Bremer has gone home and the Bush administration has cut its ties, leaving Chalabi in Baghdad with a future just as uncertain as that of the rest of his 25 million countrymen. As the new government takes its first steps with restored political authority, there was no longer any reason not to lay out his ideas.

 

The first imperative, Chalabi said, is to make sure the elections scheduled for January are carried out as promised. Allawi suggested over the weekend that the voting might have to be postponed until February or March if the security situation did not improve. But he swiftly disavowed the idea of delay the next day, recognizing the issue's sensitivity in a country repeatedly told that democracy had arrived.

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Part 2

 

The next priority should be to shake off U.S. tutelage and show Iraqis they have a government that really is in charge of the country, Chalabi declared. Even if the departure of U.S. troops is not a practical possibility, he said, the Iraqi government should display as much authority as it can under the circumstances.

 

"This is a quandary," he acknowledged. "The Iraqi government needs to assert itself as an Iraqi government, independent of the Americans, but it has to rely on the Americans to assert itself."

 

As he and many Iraqis acknowledge, Iraq's army and security services have not acquired the numbers or ability to confront violent resistance to U.S. occupation. As a result, the 141,000 U.S. troops and about 25,000 other foreign forces in Iraq will be in charge of security for the foreseeable future.

 

Allawi has few tools to back up his repeated pledges to crack down on the anti-occupation underground, Chalabi said, but he should move swiftly to give Iraqi security forces visibility on the streets. "At this time, the government doesn't have the power, but it has to show that it is doing it."

 

A good place to start, Chalabi suggested, would be with the new Iraqi National Intelligence Service set up by the CIA to replace Hussein's much-feared services. The new intelligence apparatus, hundreds strong, was organized in secret without a known budget or statute, he said.

 

The director, Brig. Gen. Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, was recruited by the CIA station in the Jordanian capital Amman after he fled Iraq in 1991, Chalabi said, and has been a favorite ever since. A member of Iraq's Turkmen minority, Shahwani reports directly to the prime minister but is closely supervised by CIA officers, Chalabi added. Under their guidance, the service has turned much of its focus toward neighboring Iran, he said.

 

According to a report prepared in April by knowledgeable officials for members of the now-disbanded Governing Council, the service roster is two-thirds Sunni Muslim and one-fourth Shiite in a country that is about 60 percent Shiite, giving rise to fears that the new service has incorporated many former members of Hussein's Sunni-dominated services.

 

"This won't fly here," Chalabi said.

 

Next, Chalabi said, the new government should grab control of the country's finances. Specifically, he said, it should demand a full accounting of how Bremer, who had check-signing authority, spent funds from the Development Fund for Iraq, a pool of cash from Iraqi oil sales designated to pay for reconstruction.

 

KPMG, the firm contracted to do an audit, issued an interim report recently complaining that lack of cooperation from Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority was preventing it from meeting a June 30 deadline.

 

In addition, Chalabi said, the U.S. Embassy, which replaced the occupation authority on Monday, has sought power to disburse some of the funds even though political authority has been returned to the Iraqi government. Allawi's government should insist that the money flow exclusively through the Iraqi Finance Ministry, Chalabi said.

 

Another step the government should take to show Iraqis that it is in charge is to shed the American and other foreign advisers who remain in some ministries, he said. These advisers have largely left such ministries as education and housing, but remain in others, such as defense and interior.

 

Finally, Chalabi suggested, Allawi and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari should make sure that they, not the United States, determine Iraqi foreign policy.

 

Iraq has a long history of Arab nationalism and support for Palestinians against Israel, dating from before Hussein's Baath Party took over in 1968. As a result, its foreign policy, if tradition and popular sentiment are followed, could end up being adversarial with that of the Bush administration.

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