Battle Of Baghdad II

[Texas Gentleman]

Salim,

 

My friend it seems your topic is closed to replys and I am short on time so I open this post "Battle of Baghdad" II.

First of all let me say I agree with your observation based on family reports you recieve. "The real fight is not between Sunni and Shia, it is between those who want to build free democratic Iraq and those who RESIST such option." Even at ITM they have the same opinion from Sunni living in Sunni/Shia mix neighborhoods.

 

from; http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/2006/11/rough-days.html20:05 :

 

"We had no choice but to rely on ourselves to protect our homes and neighborhood insurgents and militias alike. In our mixed block the elders met to assign duties and make plans in case things go wrong. They decided that people should all exchange cell-phone numbers as the fastest means to communicate at times of action, it was also decided that if someone calls to report an attack on his home, everyone else must go up to the roof and start shooting at the direction of the assailants.

 

More roadblocks were erected and older ones strengthened—streets and alleys were blocked in any possible way to prevent any attack with vehicles.

 

They also agreed that no one moves on the streets after a certain hour at night and any moving person would be dealt with as a threat.

 

The situation was terrifying and the rattle of machineguns broke through the tense quiet of the night several times every night but perhaps the star of the latest show was the mortar—there has been a frenzy of mortar fire, gladly none struck our neighborhood but we could hear the stupid death packages pass by each other in the air across our neighborhood.

 

No major incidents happened near us except some shooting at a stranger vehicle which neighbors told me carried militants who were trying to launch mortar rounds from an abandoned space but were forced to run away by the shooting.

 

The other star of the crisis was rumors about ugly revenge attacks and I sometimes feel that those rumors are part of the terrorists and militias propaganda campaign.

 

Being unable to surf the web for news, TV and radio were the main sources for news and updates about what was going on in Baghdad's vast sides but I trusted the phone more; I was making frequent calls to friends and relatives to see how they were doing.

 

One of my aunts lives in Adhamiya, she told me they received heavy bombardment from mortars. Another friend from the same sector relayed some odd news to me "there's a war raging between the Islamists and the Baathists…the Islamists have near full control now"

 

The phone brings only bad news most of the time but it's still better that to remain worried and disconnected from the surroundings.

 

Some news were really bad though, my uncle called on Friday to tell me that he and his family of eight were being forced to leave their neighborhood.

 

My Sunni uncle, his Shia wife and their children were told to leave because the head of the household is Sunni. His voice was filled with pain as he talked to me, I asked him who made the threat and he said ten cars filled with armed men came to our street shooting their guns in the air and announcing through a loudspeaker that all Sunni people must leave within 24 hours, then they went to the mosque and murdered the preacher's son.

 

The locals didn't like this of course since it was the first time they witness this level of violence and tension according to my uncle. Later that day the Shia in my uncle's neighborhood sent a delegation to the local Sadr office demanding the displacement order be cancelled. The guy in the office turned them down telling them these were "orders from above…we will kick them out the same way they kick the Shia out in other areas. They shall remain refugees until Shia refugees return to their homes"

 

Ordinary people do not approve of such atrocities but they have no power over the murderers…my other aunt who lives in the same neighborhood of my uncle's was a bit luckier because she's married to a Shia so she volunteered to hold my uncle's furniture for him while his family sought refuge at several relatives' homes.

"I'm leaving Baghdad to another city, the situation has become unbearable here…"

 

My uncle's words were killing me…

He said the delegation was still trying to convince the Sayyid to reconsider this decision but he (my uncle) would not wait to hear back because his feelings were deeply wounded—a teacher who spent 30 years teaching the kids of the neighborhood without any discrimination and now a bunch of thugs made him a target for their campaign of blind revenge."

Posted by Mohammed @ 20:05

It would seem that SUNNI AND SHIA alike think al Sadr's militias are a major part of the problems. It is beyond me how you place any hope in al Sadr's moderation. He and his organizations are becoming more dangerous to Iraqs future as each day passes.

[Texas Gentleman]

Maliki needs to get and understand this message loud and clear if he wants a unified and peaceful Iraq: Today he will hear it from GW Bush

November 29, 2006

 

Text of U.S. Security Adviser's Iraq Memo

 

Following is the text of a Nov. 8 memorandum prepared for cabinet-level officials by Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, and his aides on the National Security Council. The five-page document, classified secret, was read and transcribed by The New York Times.

 

We returned from Iraq convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others. Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek Shia hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in Iraq.

 

Maliki reiterated a vision of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish partnership, and in my one-on-one meeting with him, he impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do so. Maliki pointed to incidents, such as the use of Iraqi forces in Shia Karbala, to demonstrate his even hand. Perhaps because he is frustrated over his limited ability to command Iraqi forces against terrorists and insurgents, Maliki has been trying to show strength by standing up to the coalition. Hence the public spats with us over benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks.

 

Despite Maliki's reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki's government. Reports of non delivery of services to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister's office to stop military action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal of Iraq's most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries — when combined with the escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi's (JAM) [the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army] killings — all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.

 

While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.

 

Steps Maliki Could Take

 

There is a range of actions that Maliki could take to improve the information he receives, demonstrate his intentions to build an Iraq for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities. The actions listed below are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some point, may require additional political and security resources to execute, as described on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should:

• <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">

Compel his ministers to take small steps — such as providing health services and opening bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods — to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">Bring his political strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and bring to justice any JAM actors that do not eschew violence; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">Shake up his cabinet by appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats in key service (and security) ministries; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">Announce an overhaul of his own personal staff so that "it reflects the face of Iraq"; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">Demand that all government workers (in ministries, the Council of Representatives and his own offices) publicly renounce all violence for the pursuit of political goals as a condition for keeping their positions; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">Declare that Iraq will support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for multinational forces and will seek, as appropriate, to address bilateral issues with the United States through a SOFA [status of forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next year; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">Take one or more immediate steps to inject momentum back into the reconciliation process, such as a suspension of de-Baathification measures and the submission to the Parliament or "Council of Representatives" of a draft piece of legislation for a more judicial approach; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l1 level1 lfo2; tab-stops: list .5in">Announce plans to expand the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and Declare the immediate suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a robust program of embedding coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the Interior] units while the MOI is revetted and retrained. What We Can Do to Help Maliki

 

If Maliki is willing to move decisively on the actions above, we can help him in a variety of ways. We should be willing to:

 

Continue to target Al Qaeda and insurgent strongholds in Baghdad to demonstrate the Shia do not need the JAM to protect their families — and that we are a reliable partner;

 

Encourage Zal [Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador] to move into the background and let Maliki take more credit for positive developments. (We want Maliki to exert his authority — and demonstrate to Iraqis that he is a strong leader — by taking action against extremists, not by pushing back on the United States and the Coalition.);

• <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">

Continue our diplomatic efforts to keep the Sunnis in the political process by pushing for the negotiation of a national compact and by talking up provincial council elections next spring/summer as a mechanism for Sunni empowerment; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Support his announcement to expand the Iraqi Army and reform the MOI more aggressively; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Seek ways to strengthen Maliki immediately by giving him additional control over Iraqi forces, although we must recognize that in the immediate time frame, we would likely be able to give him more authority over existing forces, not more forces; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Continue to pressure Iran and Syria to end their interference in Iraq, in part by hitting back at Iranian proxies in Iraq and by Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in early December; andStep up our efforts to get Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in supporting Iraq by using its influence to move Sunni populations in Iraq out of violence into politics, to cut off any public or private funding provided to the insurgents or death squads from the region and to lean on Syria to terminate its support for Baathists and insurgent leaders. Augmenting Maliki's Political and Security Capabilities

 

The above approach may prove difficult to execute even if Maliki has the right intentions. He may simply not have the political or security capabilities to take such steps, which risk alienating his narrow Sadrist political base and require a greater number of more reliable forces. Pushing Maliki to take these steps without augmenting his capabilities could force him to failure — if the Parliament removes him from office with a majority vote or if action against the Mahdi militia (JAM) causes elements of the Iraqi Security Forces to fracture and leads to major Shia disturbances in southern Iraq. We must also be mindful of Maliki's personal history as a figure in the Dawa Party — an underground conspiratorial movement — during Saddam's rule. Maliki and those around him are naturally inclined to distrust new actors, and it may take strong assurances from the United States ultimately to convince him to expand his circle of advisers or take action against the interests of his own Shia coalition and for the benefit of Iraq as a whole.

 

If it is Maliki's assessment that he does not have the capability — politically or militarily — to take the steps outlined above, we will need to work with him to augment his capabilities. We could do so in two ways. First, we could help him form a new political base among moderate politicians from Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and other communities. Ideally, this base would constitute a new parliamentary bloc that would free Maliki from his current narrow reliance on Shia actors. (This bloc would not require a new election, but would rather involve a realignment of political actors within the Parliament). In its creation, Maliki would need to be willing to risk alienating some of his Shia political base and may need to get the approval of Ayatollah Sistani for actions that could split the Shia politically. Second, we need to provide Maliki with additional forces of some kind.

 

This approach would require that we take steps beyond those laid out above, to include:

 

Actively support Maliki in helping him develop an alternative political base. We would likely need to use our own political capital to press moderates to align themselves with Maliki's new political bloc;

 

Consider monetary support to moderate groups that have been seeking to break with larger, more sectarian parties, as well as to support Maliki himself as he declares himself the leader of his bloc and risks his position within Dawa and the Sadrists; and

 

Provide Maliki with more resources to help build a nonsectarian national movement.

 

• If we expect him to adopt a nonsectarian security agenda, we must ensure he has reasonably nonsectarian security institutions to execute it — such as through a more robust embedding program.

 

• We might also need to fill the current four-brigade gap in Baghdad with coalition forces if reliable Iraqi forces are not identified.

 

Moving Ahead

 

We should waste no time in our efforts to determine Maliki's intentions and, if necessary, to augment his capabilities. We might take the following steps immediately:

 

Convince Maliki to deliver on key actions that might reassure Sunnis (open banks and direct electricity rebuilding in Sunni areas, depoliticize hospitals);

 

Tell Maliki that we understand that he is working his own strategy for dealing with the Sadrists and that:

 

• you have asked General Casey to support Maliki in this effort

 

• it is important that we see some tangible results in this strategy soon;

 

Send your personal representative to Baghdad to discuss this strategy with Maliki and to press other leaders to work with him, especially if he determines that he must build an alternative political base;

 

Ask Casey to develop a plan to empower Maliki, including:

 

• Formation of National Strike Forces

 

• Dramatic increase in National Police embedding

 

• More forces under Maliki command and control

 

Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to make a recommendation about whether more forces are need in Baghdad;

 

Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to devise a more robust embedding plan and a plan to resource it;

 

Direct your cabinet to begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a leadership role on Iraq, connecting this role with other areas in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S. action;

 

If Maliki seeks to build an alternative political base:

 

• Press Sunni and other Iraqi leaders (especially Hakim) [Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Maliki rival] to support Maliki

 

• Engage Sistani to reassure and seek his support for a new nonsectarian political movement.

 

 

 

[Texas Gentleman]

Sorry for the flubbed text. I hope this corrects the flubbed part:

 

 

 

Steps Maliki Could Take

 

There is a range of actions that Maliki could take to improve the information he receives, demonstrate his intentions to build an Iraq for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities. The actions listed below are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some point, may require additional political and security resources to execute, as described on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should:

• <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">

Compel his ministers to take small steps — such as providing health services and opening bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods — to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Bring his political strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and bring to justice any JAM actors that do not eschew violence; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Shake up his cabinet by appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats in key service (and security) ministries; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Announce an overhaul of his own personal staff so that "it reflects the face of Iraq"; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Demand that all government workers (in ministries, the Council of Representatives and his own offices) publicly renounce all violence for the pursuit of political goals as a condition for keeping their positions; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Declare that Iraq will support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for multinational forces and will seek, as appropriate, to address bilateral issues with the United States through a SOFA [status of forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next year; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Take one or more immediate steps to inject momentum back into the reconciliation process, such as a suspension of de-Baathification measures and the submission to the Parliament or "Council of Representatives" of a draft piece of legislation for a more judicial approach; <LI class=MsoNormal style="MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 18pt; mso-margin-bottom-alt: auto; mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; tab-stops: list .5in">Announce plans to expand the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and Declare the immediate suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a robust program of embedding coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the Interior] units while the MOI is revetted and retrained.

Sorry for the flubbed text. I hope this corrects the flubbed part:

 

 

 

[/size]AGAIN

Steps Maliki Could Take

 

There is a range of actions that Maliki could take to improve the information he receives, demonstrate his intentions to build an Iraq for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities. The actions listed below are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some point, may require additional political and security resources to execute, as described on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should:

 

Compel his ministers to take small steps — such as providing health services and opening bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods — to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities;

 

-- Bring his political strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and bring to justice any JAM actors that do not eschew violence;

 

-- Shake up his cabinet by appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats in key service (and security) ministries;

 

Announce an overhaul of his own personal staff so that "it reflects the face of Iraq";

 

-- Demand that all government workers (in ministries, the Council of Representatives and his own offices) publicly renounce all violence for the pursuit of political goals as a condition for keeping their positions;

 

-- Declare that Iraq will support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for multinational forces and will seek, as appropriate, to address bilateral issues with the United States through a SOFA [status of forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next year;

 

-- Take one or more immediate steps to inject momentum back into the reconciliation process, such as a suspension of de-Baathification measures and the submission to the Parliament or "Council of Representatives" of a draft piece of legislation for a more judicial approach;

 

-- Announce plans to expand the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and

 

-- Declare the immediate suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a robust program of embedding coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the Interior] units while the MOI is revetted and retrained.

[Texas Gentleman]

Sorry Again;

 

Sorry for the flubbed text. I hope this corrects the flubbed part:

 

Steps Maliki Could Take

There is a range of actions that Maliki could take to improve the information he receives, demonstrate his intentions to build an Iraq for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities. The actions listed below are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some point, may require additional political and security resources to execute, as described on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should:

 

Compel his ministers to take small steps — such as providing health services and opening bank branches in Sunni neighborhoods — to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic communities;

 

-- Bring his political strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and bring to justice any JAM actors that do not eschew violence;

 

-- Shake up his cabinet by appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats in key service (and security) ministries;

 

Announce an overhaul of his own personal staff so that "it reflects the face of Iraq";

 

-- Demand that all government workers (in ministries, the Council of Representatives and his own offices) publicly renounce all violence for the pursuit of political goals as a condition for keeping their positions;

 

-- Declare that Iraq will support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for multinational forces and will seek, as appropriate, to address bilateral issues with the United States through a SOFA [status of forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next year;

 

-- Take one or more immediate steps to inject momentum back into the reconciliation process, such as a suspension of de-Baathification measures and the submission to the Parliament or "Council of Representatives" of a draft piece of legislation for a more judicial approach;

 

-- Announce plans to expand the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and

 

-- Declare the immediate suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a robust program of embedding coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the Interior] units while the MOI is revetted and retrained.

 

What We Can Do to Help Maliki

 

Encourage Zal [Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador] to move into the background and let Maliki take more credit for positive developments. (We want Maliki to exert his authority — and demonstrate to Iraqis that he is a strong leader — by taking action against extremists, not by pushing back on the United States and the Coalition.);

 

-- Continue our diplomatic efforts to keep the Sunnis in the political process by pushing for the negotiation of a national compact and by talking up provincial council elections next spring/summer as a mechanism for Sunni empowerment;

 

-- Support his announcement to expand the Iraqi Army and reform the MOI more aggressively;

 

-- Seek ways to strengthen Maliki immediately by giving him additional control over Iraqi forces, although we must recognize that in the immediate time frame, we would likely be able to give him more authority over existing forces, not more forces;

 

-- Continue to pressure Iran and Syria to end their interference in Iraq, in part by hitting back at Iranian proxies in Iraq and by Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors meeting in the region in early December; and

 

-- Step up our efforts to get Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in supporting Iraq by using its influence to move Sunni populations in Iraq out of violence into politics, to cut off any public or private funding provided to the insurgents or death squads from the region and to lean on Syria to terminate its support for Baathists and insurgent leaders.

[Texas Gentleman]

November 28, 2006

Hezbollah Said to Help Shiite Army in Iraq

By MICHAEL R. GORDON and DEXTER FILKINSWASHINGTON, Nov. 27 — A senior American intelligence official said Monday that the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah had been training members of the Mahdi Army, the Iraqi Shiite militia led by Moktada al-Sadr.

 

The official said that 1,000 to 2,000 fighters from the Mahdi Army and other Shiite militias had been trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon. A small number of Hezbollah operatives have also visited Iraq to help with training, the official said.

 

Iran has facilitated the link between Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Iraq, the official said. Syrian officials have also cooperated, though there is debate about whether it has the blessing of the senior leaders in Syria.

 

The intelligence official spoke on condition of anonymity under rules set by his agency, and discussed Iran's role in response to questions from a reporter.

 

The interview occurred at a time of intense debate over whether the United States should enlist Iran's help in stabilizing Iraq. The Iraq Study Group, directed by James A. Baker III, a former Republican secretary of state, and Lee H. Hamilton, a former Democratic lawmaker, is expected to call for direct talks with Tehran.

 

The claim about Hezbollah's role in training Shiite militias could strengthen the hand of those in the Bush administration who oppose a major new diplomatic involvement with Iran.

 

The new American account is consistent with a claim made in Iraq this summer by a mid-level Mahdi commander, who said his militia had sent 300 fighters to Lebanon, ostensibly to fight alongside Hezbollah. "They are the best-trained fighters in the Mahdi Army," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

 

The specific assertions about Iran's role went beyond those made publicly by senior American officials, though Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, did tell Congress this month that "the Iranian hand is stoking violence" in Iraq.

 

The American intelligence on Hezbollah was based on human sources, electronic means and interviews with detainees captured in Iraq.

 

American officials say the Iranians have also provided direct support to Shiite militias in Iraq, including explosives and trigger devices for roadside bombs, and training for several thousand fighters, mostly in Iran. The training is carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, they say.

 

In Congressional testimony this month, General Hayden said he was initially skeptical of reports of Iran's role but changed his mind after reviewing intelligence reports.

 

"I'll admit personally," he said at one point in the hearing, "that I have come late to this conclusion, but I have all the zeal of a convert as to the ill effect that the Iranians are having on the situation in Iraq."

 

Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, offered a similar assessment in his testimony.

 

Neither General Hayden nor General Maples described Hezbollah's role during the hearing.

 

In the interview on Monday, the senior intelligence official was asked for further details about the purported Iranian role.

 

"They have been a link to Lebanese Hezbollah and have helped facilitate Hezbollah training inside of Iraq, but more importantly Jaish al-Mahdi members going to Lebanon," the official said, describing Iran's role and using the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army.

 

The official said the Hezbollah training had been conducted with the knowledge of Mr. Sadr, the most influential Shiite cleric.

 

While Iran wants a stable Iraq, the official said, it sees an advantage in "managed instability in the near term" to bog down the American military and defeat the Bush administration's objectives in the region.

 

"There seems to have been a strategic decision taken sometime over late winter or early spring by Damascus, Tehran, along with their partners in Lebanese Hezbollah, to provide more support to Sadr to increase pressure on the U.S.," the American intelligence official said.

 

Some Middle East experts were skeptical about the assessment of Hezbollah's training role.

 

"That sound to me a little bit strained," said Flynt Leverett, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and a Middle East expert formerly on the National Security Council staff. "I have a hard time thinking it is a really significant piece of what we are seeing play out on the ground with the various Shiite militia forces."

 

But other specialists found the assessment plausible. "I think it is plausible because Hezbollah is the best in the business, and it enhances their position with Iran, Syria and Iraq," said Judith Kipper, of the Council on Foreign Relations.

 

The Mahdi Army and other militia fighters traveled to Lebanon in groups of 15 and 20 and some were present during the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel this summer, though there was no indication they had taken part in the fighting, the American intelligence official said.

 

Asked what the militia members had learned, the official replied, "Weapons, bomb-making, intelligence, assassinations, the gambit of skill sets."

 

There is intelligence that indicates that Iran shipped machine tools to Lebanon that could be used to make "shaped charges," sophisticated explosive devices designed to penetrate armor, American officials have said. But it is not known how the equipment was in fact used.

 

The officials said that because the Iraqi militia members went through Syrian territory, at least some Syrian officials were complicit. There are also reports of meetings between Imad Mugniyah, a senior Hezbollah member; Ghassem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; and Syrian representatives to discuss ways of stepping up the pressure on the United States in Iraq.

 

The mid-level Mahdi commander interviewed this summer said the group sent to Lebanon was called the Ali al-Hadi Brigade, named for one of two imams buried at the Askariya Mosque in Samarra. The bombing of that shrine in February unleashed the fury of Shiite militias and accelerated sectarian violence.

 

According to the Mahdi commander, the brigade was organized and dispatched by a senior Mahdi officer known as Abu Mujtaba. It went by bus to Syria in July, and was then led across the border into Lebanon, he said. He said the fighters were from Diwaniya and Basra, as well as from the Shiite neighborhoods of Shoala and Sadr City in Baghdad.

 

"They travel as normal people from Iraq to Syria," one of the militiamen said. "Once they get to Syria, fighters in Syria take them in."

 

Among American officials, concern over the purported Iranian, Syrian or Hezbollah role grew recently when an advanced antitank weapon, an RPG-29, was used against an American M-1 tank in Iraq.

 

"The first time we saw it was not in Iraq," Gen. John P. Abizaid, the head of the United States Central Command, told reporters in September. "We saw it in Lebanon. So to me, No. 1, it indicates an Iranian connection."

 

American intelligence officials said the source of the weapon was still unclear.

 

General Abizaid also said it was hard to pin down some details of relationships between armed factions in the Middle East, adding: "There are clearly links between Hezbollah training people in Iran to operate in Lebanon and also training people in Iran that are Shia splinter groups that could operate against us in Iraq These linkages exist, but it is very, very hard to pin down with precision."

 

Mark Mazzetti contributed reporting from Washington, and Hosham Hussein from Baghdad.

 

 

 

Security Council extends Iraq mandate Tue Nov 28, 3:30 PM ET

 

The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously Tuesday to extend the mandate of the 160,000-member multinational force in Iraq.

 

The council acted quickly in response to a request from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who said a top government priority is to assume full responsibility for security and stability in the country but it needs more time.

 

The resolution, drafted by the United States, extends the mandate of the multinational force for one year starting on Dec. 31 and authorizes a review at the request of the Iraqi government or by June 15.

 

The resolution contains the same provision as past resolutions -- a commitment that the council "will terminate this mandate earlier if requested by the government of Iraq."

 

Al-Maliki's request for the one-year extension with a termination clause came as the Bush administration stepped up diplomatic efforts to stabilize the country.

[Texas Gentleman]

Al-Sadr Loyalists Boycott Iraq Government

 

BAGHDAD, Iraq - Lawmakers and Cabinet ministers loyal to anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr said Wednesday they have carried out their threat to suspend participation in Parliament and the government to protest Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's summit with U.S. President George W. Bush.

 

The 30 lawmakers and five Cabinet ministers said their action was necessary because the meeting in Jordan constituted a "provocation to the feelings of the Iraqi people and a violation of their constitutional rights." Their statement did not explain that claim.

 

Al-Maliki and Bush are meeting in Amman, the Jordanian capital, Wednesday and Thursday in a summit aimed at halting Iraq's escalating sectarian violence and paving the way for a reduction of American troops.

 

"We are sticking to our position. ... The boycott is still valid," Falih Hassan, a Sadrist legislator, said in an interview with The Associated Press. "Bush is a criminal who killed a lot of Iraqis and we do not want him to interfere in Iraq's affairs. The Iraqi government should negotiate with the U.N. Security Council, not with the leader of the country that is occupying Iraq." (what a disgusting load of crap from this scumbag Falih Hassan)