Change of Course in Iraq Strategy

[BahirJ]

 

Here is the memo submitted by D. Ramsfeld to US President

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

December 3, 2006

Rumsfeld’s Memo of Options for Iraq War

Following is the text of a classified Nov. 6 memorandum that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld sent to the White House suggesting new options in Iraq. The memorandum was sent one day before the midterm Congressional elections and two days before Mr. Rumsfeld resigned.

 

Nov. 6, 2006

 

SUBJECT: Iraq — Illustrative New Courses of Action

 

The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options:

 

 

ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS

 

Above the Line: (Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others)

 

¶Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. — political, economic and security goals — to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).

 

¶Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.

 

¶Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units’ language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.

 

¶Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)

 

¶Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.

 

¶Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.

 

¶Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.

 

¶Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, “If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it.” No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.

 

¶Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.

 

¶Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. — and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.

 

¶Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start “taking our hand off the bicycle seat”), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

 

¶Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.

 

¶Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.

 

¶Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not “lose.”

 

¶Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) — go minimalist.

 

Below the Line (less attractive options):

 

¶Continue on the current path.

 

¶Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it.

 

¶Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially.

 

¶Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. Tell Iran and Syria to stay out.

 

¶Assist in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan, moving towards three separate states — Sunni, Shia, and Kurd.

 

¶Try a Dayton-like process.

 

 

 

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[Texas Gentleman]

I have always believed Donald Rumsfield is the smartest man in American Politics. His failure as the Secretary of Defense is actually not his but a failure of OGS (other Government Services) and In particular the US State Department who are career diplomats and not war-fighters. I blame them for wanting to drive the car carrying our soldiers 30 miles for each one driver they provided while our Soldiers had 10,000 miles to travel. Meaning they hardly got in country before they were relieved (to go home) by a new driver who didnt know the route. I believe now we do not have a true partner with most Iraqi's because of the ineptitude of our State Dept.s people. Those who might have had the ability to restore the law with civil order and in plannning Iraq's reconstruction were in Iraq hardly long enough to learn basic Iraq law and customs before they were liberally rotated home ..... (allowed to go home taking their short learning curve with them.) And In with the next 90day wonders !!

 

Iraq occupation should have been the perview of one of our toughest no nonsense Generals and completely directed under his Militarys command. ( not the squemish State Dept. civilians) . Much less Jaw and a lot more raw in nation building !!

 

I agree with Secretary Rumsfields's recommedations mostly (all above the line with one exception) and prioritized by me as Stage #1, #2 and #3. for what to do now . None of the (below the line) is worth shedding another drop of American blood for. Its time YOU Iraqi's chose whos side you are on.

 

 

 

...........................................

Above the Line: (Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others)

 

#1 Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) — go minimalist.

 

 

1 Stage;

 

1 Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not "lose."

 

 

1 Retain high-end SOF (show of force – stand off force) capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other Coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.

 

1 Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.

 

1 Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, "If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it." No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.

1 Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.

 

1 Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.

 

1 Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)

 

 

2nd Stage;

 

2 Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units' language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.

 

 

2 Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.

 

 

3rd Stage;

3 Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. — and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.

 

3 Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start "taking our hand off the bicycle seat"), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

 

3 Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.

 

Forget about it;

 

#0 Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.

................................................................................

..........

 

[Mutergem]

http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2006/images/12/06/iraq.report.pdf

 

The Iraq study group report