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Baghdadee بغدادي

An Enemy We Can Work With ???

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FROM ITM (Iraq The Model) and my view

......... a difference between Allawi's plan to walk away from the government and those of Sadr. Looks like some of our earlier specualtions BELOW were correct.


Sadr ministers out, now what?

[/size]In a sudden move, Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has pulled his ministers out of the Iraqi cabinet. Many people are asking me why. It's a good question, and I've being thinking about the reasons and implications. They aren't very easy to determine because of the jumpy, and often illogical, way that this political faction thinks and behaves.


One possible theory being circulated is the six ministers were already on their way to be replaced according to PM Maliki's cabinet reshuffle plan. So the resignations were like quitting your job before your boss fires you in order to preserve your dignity and save face.


But this explanation strikes me as overly simplistic.

The faction's threat to leave the government, and the decision to go forward with it, took place while other developments elsewhere, in the country in which the Sadr group is a major player, were taking place and may have played a role in the decision..


What I think is that Sadr is making a decision in which he plans to switch from half-government-half-opposition status to all-out opposition.

This has not been declared explicitly so far.

Why? Because while Sadr's followers are still quite strong, whether in the political wing or in the Mehdi army, they haven't and appear incapable of achieving the level of exclusive dominance they aspire to. They can make serious trouble and occupy the streets for a while when they want, but those periods of time aren't enough for them anymore.


Thus far, the results of the war between Sadr on one side and the government and the coalition on the other side - particularly in the southern part of the country- have been a disappointment for Sadr. It's likely that he's considering adopting a new approach by openly declaring his party in the opposition.



In Diwaniya, his militiamen have been defeated and the Iraqi and coalition forces are back in control. In Hilla, the Mehdi army members are being dealt with as outlaws by the local security forces. At least one of Sadr's offices was burned a few weeks ago, and the statements by local officials during the last month or two clearly showed determination on not letting the militia take over the city.

It's actually a complex situation because this approach will very likely be different from the one Sadr used back in 2003 and 2004 when his group was yet to become part of the political process. Back then, Sadr was the spiritual leader as well as the field commander of his militia, publicly endorsing his fighters and not hiding his involvement in the armed "resistance".


In my opinion, Sadr and his political wing will now pretend to distance themselves from the armed wing, which is what they've been doing for some time now, while actually keeping -if not increasing- the support for armed operations against military and civilian targets. at the same time, they will try to drive more people into opposing the government and the presence of coalition troops with spectacular protests here and there. And they will find nothing wrong if those "peaceful protesters" occasionally decide to use force and shoot at Iraqi and US soldiers or eliminate those who collaborate with the government and the coalition, because "that's not us, not the Mehdi army. It's the people's reaction to an incompetent government and an illegal occupation".


Now that they have left the government, they're going to take advantage of simple-minded people who will no longer blame them for lack of basic services, because the Sadrists are not part of this government anymore. They will redirect all the blame onto Maliki and the coalition, when in fact, it was the Sadr bloc ministers who were controlling three of the most important ministries in charge of basic services: Health, Education and Transportation, in addition to three others.

That's a point dwarfed by the militia's direct role in Iraqi's suffering.


Hints of this new policy are already in the air: the Sadrists organized large protests in Basra yesterday, in which reportedly thousands chanted against the local government in demand of better services and warning of an escalation if their demands are not met. Meanwhile the al-Fadheela Party, to which the governor belongs, said it was afraid some group might assassinate him. Of course, Sadr's aides denied any involvement in the planning of the protests and protestors were carrying Iraqi flags instead of Sadr's banners as usual. Still, not many people really bought the act.


Sadr is of the kind of tyrant who would try all methods he can to either control the entire nation of Iraq or, if he fails, destroy it altogether.

His inability to control the country from within the political process makes me think that he'll try for the latter.


Finally, it's worth noting that the words which Sadr used to close his message to Maliki this week, were technically an open threat.

In the Islamic culture, the expression "Assalam ala man Ittaba' al-Huda" (or "peace be upon those who follow the right path") includes more threats than wishes for peace: its implied meaning is "Follow the right path [our path] or face the consequences."



Let's take a look at the explicit coup intentions that don't only want to return to the days of dictatorship but want to take us back to the dark ages: (Texas Gentleman's View)


23/05/2007 21:52 (توقيت غرينتش)




أكدت مصادر مقربة من مقتدى الصدر زعيم التيار الصدري المتواري عن الانظار أن المرحلة المقبلة في العراق ستشهد سيطرة مؤيدي الصدر على الحكومة من خلال تجنب الاشتباك مع القوات الأميركية، واعتماد التصعيد الخطابي المطالب بخروج القوات الأجنبية وتعزيز المكاسب السياسية في بغداد والجنوب وتقوية العلاقات مع إيران.


وأشار تقرير لوكالة الأسوشيتدبرس الأربعاء إلى ان الصدر يخطط لملء الفراغ الذي سيخلفه الانسحاب الاميركي من العراق ومرض منافسه عبد العزيز الحكيم الذي يعاني من سرطان الرئة. ونقل التقرير عن عدد من المسؤولين في التيار الصدري، رفضوا الكشف عن اسمائهم، أن استراتيجية الصدر تعتمد جزئيا على الاعتقاد السائد من أن الادارة الاميركية ستسحب قواتها من العراق قريبا أو انها ستخفض عددها هناك مخلفة فراغا امنيا وسياسيا كبيرين.


وكان وزير الدفاع العراقي عبد القادر العبيدي صرح يوم الإثنين بأن الجيش العراقي يضع خططا استعدادا لاي انسحاب أميركي مفاجيء. وأضاف المسؤولون الصدريون أن الصدر يعتقد أن حكومة المالكي لن تصمد في حال خروج القوات الأميركية بسبب فشلها في الملف الأمني والخدمي والاقتصادي، مما سيقود إلى تشكيل تحالفات سياسية جديدة يكون فيها التيار الصدري الذي يشغل 30 مقعدا في البرلمان الرابح الأكبر.


وأوضح أحد المسؤولين الصدريين الستة الذي تحدثوا لوكالة اسوشيتدبرس "أن التيار الصدري منح حكومة المالكي فرصة تاريخية، إلا أن رئيس الوزراء لم يستثمرها، لذا فإننا نعد العدة كي نشكل القيادة الجديدة للعراق". وأضاف أن العراق سيكون إسلاميا في ظل قيادة التيار الصدري.


ويقول المسؤولون الأميركيون إن الصدر موجود في إيران منذ ثلاثة أشهر، فيما بدأ عدد من المقربين منه مؤخرا بالاعتراف بأن الصدر موجود فعلا في إيران، وليس كما أشيع في البداية من أنه عاد إلى النجف. وفي المقابل قام المجلس الأعلى للثورة الإسلامية سابقا والمجلس الأعلى الإسلامي العراقي حاليا، الحليف الشيعي الآخر لإيران، باعتماد بعض التغييرات السياسية من قبيل تغيير الاسم وإعلان التمسك بمبدئي حقوق الإنسان والديموقراطية، في خطوة فسرت على أنها محاولة حثيثة من قبل تيار الحكيم للاقتراب من أميركا بشكل أكبر. إلا أن إصابة الحكيم بمرض سرطان الرئة أبعده، ولو بصورة مؤقتة، عن الساحة السياسية، حسب تقرير الوكالة.


وأشار التقرير الى أن الشيعة يعرفون ماذا تعني سيطرة التيار الصدري على الحكومة العراقية، من خلال التشدد الديني الذي يفرضه جيش المهدي في مدينة الصدر، حيث يفرض على البنات منذ سن السابعة ارتداء الحجاب الإسلامي، ويمنع بيع المشروبات الحكولية، ويطبق تشريعات إسلامية يعاقب فيها بعض الناس بالجلد.


ونقل التقرير عن نصار الربيعي، عضو البرلمان عن التيار الصدري قوله انهم يريدون نظاما رئاسيا مشابها لحكم الخليفة الإسلامي. أما غفران الساعدي وصالح العكيلي عضوا مجلس النواب فأكدا أن التيار الصدري سيسعى إلى تصحيح خطأه عندما امتنع من المشاركة في انتخابات يناير/ كانون الثاني عام 2005 والتي أدت إلى هيمنة تيارات شيعية منافسه

للتيار الصدري على مجالس محافظات الوسط والجنوب.




One of the six Sadr movement officials told AP that "The Sadr movement offered Maliki a historic opportunity but the Prime Minister didn't use it. That's why we are planning to form the new leadership of Iraq" and added that Iraq will be Islamic under the leadership of the Sadr movement.


Sources close to Moqtada Sadr affirmed that the coming stage in Iraq will witness the control of Sadr's followers over the government through avoiding confronting the American forces and using verbal escalation to demand the departure of foreign troops, improving political gains in Baghdad and the south and strengthening the relations with Iran.


OR ( Salims view) from a reporter Texas Gentleman has some respect of.





WHEN the populist Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr emerged from 14 weeks of invisibility on May 25, it was hard not to focus on his typically passionate anti-Coalition rhetoric: "No, no to America; no, no to occupation," he thundered from the mosque at Kufa, Iraq, a ragged town a few miles north of rich holy city of Najaf.




It reminded me of my first visit to the Kufa mosque, in August 2004. I had just walked and driven up from Najaf, where Mr. Sadr's second great uprising against Coalition troops was in its dying stages after more than three weeks. I was the only visible foreigner in the mosque for an unusually packed and angry Friday prayers.The mosque, which Mr. Sadr's Mahdi Army was using as a hospital of sorts, had just been hit by something that everyone said was an American rocket. The shoes of dead fighters lay in piles inside the entrance. Outside, thick, angry crowds milled around.



That was almost three years ago. Mr. Sadr's re-emergence — American officials say he had been hiding in Iran, while his followers say he was lying low around Najaf — in such a suggestive place was undoubtedly meant to be a reminder of the young cleric's disruptive potential. But I think the real lesson about Mr. Sadr's return is subtler, and far more positive.


It is no accident that he preaches from the Kufa mosque rather than the more prestigious one at Najaf. As the site of the tomb of Imam Ali, the great martyr of Shiism, Najaf is the center of the Shiite clerical hierarchy, a Vatican of sorts for the faith. It is a rich city.



But Moktada al-Sadr leads a movement of the poor, inherited from his father, who inherited it from an uncle. His singsong exhortation in Kufa last week was a direct reference to the most famous cry from his father's epic, and ultimately suicidal, sermons under Saddam Hussein in the 1980s: "Yes, yes, to electricity. Yes, yes, to water." Young Mr. Sadr speaks not for the elites but for the biggest and most deprived group of people in Iraq: the Shiite lower orders.


And this is why if he really wanted the Americans to leave tomorrow, we would know about it.


He is the only Iraqi religious leader to have militarily stood up to the Coalition in the four years since the invasion (he did so twice, first in the spring and then in the late summer of 2004). When Mr. Sadr fights, he fights. His followers may continue to participate in a few freelance kidnappings and homemade bomb attacks, but a true Sadrist uprising is more like an earthquake.


Fortunately, Mr. Sadr is supporting what remains of hope in Iraq far more actively than it appears. For example, when the current security plan began in Baghdad in January, one of the first moves was the setting up of a joint American-Iraqi outpost in the slum of Sadr City, the young cleric's "back yard."


I remember being in Sadr City during one of the 2004 uprisings. I watched as Iraqis tied an American soldier's boot to a balcony, a gruesome trophy. A year later I saw the same boot in the same place. It was a warning symbol: the area was essentially no-go for the Americans. During the long spells of relative peace American platoons would roll through on quick patrols or stop on a street corner to oversee distribution of gasoline for maybe half a day. But they wouldn't linger.



Sadr City is Moktada al-Sadr's place, and the Americans have never come close to subduing it. There would not be an American forward outpost permanently stationed there, with patrols going out every day, if Mr. Sadr didn't want it. The fact is that back in January, the whole thing was closely and specifically negotiated between the Americans, the Iraqi government and Mr. Sadr's people.



Likewise, when Mr. Sadr withdrew all six ministers of his party from the cabinet in April, it was greeted by the press as a prelude to Iraq's next great cataclysm. Few recalled that he had done more or less the same last fall, in protest at Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's meeting in Jordan with President Bush. That gesture, greeted with similar alarmism, was followed two months later, as this one will be, by a return of the Sadrists to their posts.



Nor did most commentators note that even as he pulled out of the cabinet, Mr. Sadr was keeping his 30 members in Parliament, or that the ministries he was given sway over in the power-sharing agreement were still being run by their Sadrist appointees.


The Sadrists' cooperation with their own government gets ever deeper. An Iraqi friend of mine in Baghdad recently tagged along with a Mahdi Army element on a mission to Baghdad's Dora neighborhood, a particularly bloody place where the Mahdi Army used to play an active role in protecting Shiites from Sunni "cleansing." My friend and the Sadrists drove to Dora at midnight, confirmed that the Iraqi Army was there and keeping the Shiite families safe, and went home.



There is also much concern in Washington and elsewhere that Mr. Sadr may be a pawn of the Iranians. This notion ignores the history of his movement and the essential nationalism underlying his project. By allying themselves with and speaking for the Shiite poor, Mr. Sadr and his father have long differentiated themselves from the traditional Shiite hierarchy in Najaf, with its great wealth and its ties to Iran.


The Sadrist movement has always been about Iraq for the Iraqis. They might accept help from Iran — and I saw Iranian supplies in their compounds in Najaf in 2004 — but the movement is not for sale. Mr. Sadr gets his strength from the street. And the Arabs of the Iraqi street have no time for Persian bosses.



Nor do they seem to want to foment an all-out civil war. For all the time I have spent with Sadrist death-squad leaders who focus on killing former Baathists and Al Qaeda's supporters (Sunnis all), I have spent just as much time with Mahdi men who have been sent by their leaders to protect Sunni mosques after Sunni provocations, lest Shiites retaliate too broadly.


It was no coincidence that in February, a few weeks after the Baghdad security plan started, a Sunni mosque was reopened in Sadr City. Nor is it a coincidence that the current plan, while it has largely failed to stop car bombs, which are primarily a Sunni phenomenon, has for the moment more or less ended the type of violence in which the Mahdi Army participated most: roving death squads.


Why would Mr. Sadr cooperate with the Americans and Mr. Maliki's government? While he runs the biggest popular movement in the country, his followers are far from a majority. He is doing exactly what any other rational actor would do: He keeps up the angry rhetoric, and he plays ball with the democratic project.


For proof, look back to the key political event in post-invasion Iraq: the December 2005 elections. For months beforehand, Mr. Sadr railed against the legitimacy of elections held under foreign occupation. The press salivated over the coming apocalypse. But I spent several weeks at that time living with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City. Behind the scenes, they were committed to full, active and peaceful participation. Eventually Mr. Sadr joined the main Shiite coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and placed 29 of his candidates in Parliament, the second-largest among the Shiite bloc.


The real story about Moktada al-Sadr is not his exciting sermons but his broad underwriting, both passive and active, of the official project in Iraq. Since he stood down his forces in August 2004, he has provided the same narrative time and again. It is what we should expect from the canniest politician in Iraq: the rhetoric of the dispossessed, and the actions of an heir to power.


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The operation "is at a difficult point right now, to be sure," said Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, the deputy commander of the First Cavalry Division, which has responsibility for Baghdad.

In an interview, he said that while military planners had expected to make greater gains by now, that has not been possible in large part because Iraqi police and army units, which were expected to handle basic security tasks, like manning checkpoints and conducting patrols, have not provided all the forces promised, and in some cases have performed poorly.

That is forcing American commanders to conduct operations to remove insurgents from some areas multiple times. The heavily Shiite security forces have also repeatedly failed to intervene in some areas when fighters, who fled or laid low when the American troops arrived, resumed sectarian killings.

"Until you have the ability to have a presence on the street by people who are seen as honest and who are not letting things come back in," said General Brooks, referring to the Iraqi police units, "you can't shift into another area and expect that place to stay the way it was."




Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno .................. in order to meet that timetable, he added, the Iraqi Security Forces would have to make strides in coming months at maintaining security. "Ultimately the I.S.F., and specifically the police, are the key to holding an area," he said. "We have to within the next four months move them more toward holding the areas we have cleared."


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ snipit~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


........ the security plan will increase the number of American troops in the city to around 30,000, up from 21,000 before the operation, an American officer said.



In addition, around 30,000 Iraqi Army and national police forces and another 21,000 policemen have been deployed in Baghdad. Many of the Iraqi units have turned up at less than full strength and other units have been redeployed from the capital, General Brooks said, leaving fewer than expected.


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ snipit ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


In some parts of the city, commanders have yet to attempt large-scale clearing operations. For example, American forces have moved into only a small portion of Sadr City, the vast slum on the city's east side that is a Shiite stronghold.


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ snipit ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




Sending large number of troops in there could incite heavy violence and opposition from Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's largely Shiite government, several officers said.

The problems facing American troops are illustrated in troubled western Baghdad. In the Rashid district there, the First Battalion, Fourth Brigade of the First Infantry Division has been working since March to carry out the security push.

When the battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Patrick Frank, moved in, it was replacing a lone American Army company of 125 soldiers. Yet even with three times as many soldiers patrolling the area, violence has worsened. Last month, 249 bodies were found in the sector, up from 98 the month Colonel Frank arrived, according to statistics compiled by the battalion.

Lately, his troops have been hit by a wave of roadside bomb attacks that have killed five of them and wounded 13 others. "We have a tough fight ahead of us," he said.




The district includes Ameel, Baya, Jihad and Furat, mostly mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods abutting the road to the Baghdad airport where his troops have established three patrol bases. Before the new strategy, there were none.

The area, a mixture of poorer urban slums and middle-class dwellings, once home to many retired professionals, has been troubled for years. Violence dipped there and across the city in the first months of the year, but has since worsened.

Militants, many associated with the Mahdi Army of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, have resumed a push to drive Sunnis from their few enclaves, American commanders said. One of the area's last Sunni mosques was bombed Wednesday.



"This area used to be primarily Sunni, but in the last six months Jaish al-Mahdi has conducted essentially a cleansing campaign," said Colonel Frank, using the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army.


In addition to carrying out sectarian killings, the Mahdi Army controls two of the area's three gas stations, which refuse to sell to most Sunnis. Gunmen regularly attacked trash trucks when they entered Sunni areas until the American military began providing security. Sunni homes are also the targets of arson attacks if their occupants fail to heed warnings to leave, he said.

Sunni insurgents have fought back as well, with two large car bomb attacks in largely Shiite sections of Baya and Ameel that killed more than 60 people, officers said.



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ snipit ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


American officers worry that many members of the largely Shiite police force sympathize or collaborate with the Mahdi Army.



The local commander of the Iraqi national police, a force run by the Shiite-run Interior Ministry, has been replaced three times since March.




One of those commanders, Col. Nadir al-Jabouri, a Shiite described by Colonel Frank as the most aggressive and even-handed Iraqi officer he had seen. But he was detained in late March by the Interior Ministry and accused of having ties to insurgents.




"He was not a protector of the people; he was a terrorist," said Col. Vhafir Kader Jowda, his Shiite replacement.




American patrols have been attacked in a wave of deadly bombings recently, sometimes within sight of police checkpoints, officers said.

Ten soldiers under Colonel Frank's command have been killed since March. At least eight of the recent attacks in the area have used explosively formed penetrators, or E.F.P.'s, powerful bombs able to pierce armored Humvees.




When Colonel Frank went to the Ameel police station recently accompanied by a reporter and asked for help in capturing a local Shiite sheik believed to be behind the bombings, the police official he was meeting with spoke in a whisper. "They listen to us," he said, pointing to a ventilation grill on his wall. "I am in danger just by meeting with you."




A few weeks earlier, angered by the attacks on his soldiers, Colonel Frank ordered a video camera hidden near an abandoned swimming pool along a main road in Ameel, near a police checkpoint, where patrols had been hit repeatedly.




When the video was examined after another attack, it showed two Iraqi policemen talking with companions, who were heard off-camera, apparently laying an explosive device. Minutes after the policemen were seen driving away, the camera showed a powerful bomb detonating as an American Humvee came into view.


The video of the attack, which just missed the vehicle and caused no casualties, was shown to a reporter from The New York Times.




After police commanders were confronted with the video in mid-May, six Iraqi officers were arrested, Colonel Frank said.




But the episode has not been forgotten. At a weekly meeting where military commanders and police chiefs sit around a horseshoe-shaped conference table at one of the American bases, Capt. Adel Fakry, the Ameel police commander, complained that American soldiers on patrol were showing "distrust" toward his officers.


"The reason there is distrust," Colonel Frank responded, his voice rising, "is because I have a video of six Iraqi officers placing a bomb against my soldiers, and they came from your station."



There had been "some mistakes," Captain Fakry responded, looking taken aback by the confrontation. Not all of the six officers were from his station, he added before ending the conversation by flipping open his cellphone and making a call while the meeting continued.

The same distrust has hampered relations throughout Baghdad since the strategy began. In Shula, a neighborhood just east of Kadhimiya, north of Rashid, American troops in March discovered a group of Iraqis in police uniforms setting up an E.F.P. near a bridge. They were using police vehicles to provide cover.


The American soldiers killed two of the bomb planters. They later discovered that one had a badge granting him wide access to the Green Zone, the fortified area in central Baghdad where the American Embassy and most Iraqi government buildings are situated.




"That's the level of penetration that these guys have," said Lt. Col. Steven M. Miska, deputy commander of the Second Brigade, First Infantry Division, which is charged with controlling northwestern Baghdad.


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ End ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Yes sir, you sure gotta admire that mooky guy, ......you know that guy dont know what his militia is doing don't you?


Imagine what a country Iraq could become if all Iraqis put that much energy in actually building something instead of tearing it down !!!

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  • 2 weeks later...

In a rather strange interview , Iraqi web site ALMALEF "The file" quated Shiekh Awss Alkhfagee saying that Iranian intelligence is setting a station in Emara city that is responsible for the latest instability in TheeQar province to blame the Sadrees for being responsible. Mr. Alkhfagee is prominent Sadre leader and Muqtada special envoy that was captured by the British forces on his arrival from Syria at Basra airport. last month He was later released by the US forces. He claimed that the Americans was asking him of any possible rule in the new coming era and that they told him that they are planning to remove Almaliki government . he accused some fellow Shia groups of pushing for his capture on a baseless accusation, but Maliki intervene was behind his release.

The interview was not confirmed by any Sadree source, so we need not take it as serious report. However, if it turned to be correct, it would flag a very serious development.. Need to wait and see if he would chose to deny the report.

He accused the TheeQar police of being inflated by Iranian intellegence which was responsible of capturing many Sadrees and jailed for no reason. NT had accused the Awsee last month that he was planning to burn the oil wells in TheeQar





It was not he first message by an Alsdree figure of critisizing the Iranians, Muqtada Alsader himself, on Iraqia , told Al iraqia in a lenghty interview that Iranian or any other should have no say about Iraq. He critisized the last Iranian-US meeting about Iraq, callin it a recognition of occupation. When asked about his relation with the Iranian , He put it a very brief words of normalizing Iraqi relations with all neighbors on condition of not intervening into Iraqi affairs.

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What I Saw in Iraq

Iran remains a problem, but Anbar has joined the fight against terror.



Friday, June 15, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT





Here, too, however, a little perspective is useful. While benchmarks are critically important, American soldiers are not fighting in Iraq today only so that Iraqis can pass a law to share oil revenues. They are fighting because a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, overrun by al Qaeda and Iran, would be a catastrophe for American national security and our safety here at home. They are fighting al Qaeda and agents of Iran in order to create the stability in Iraq that will allow its government to take over, to achieve the national reconciliation that will enable them to pass the oil law and other benchmark legislation.

I returned from Iraq grateful for the progress I saw and painfully aware of the difficult problems that remain ahead. But I also returned with a renewed understanding of how important it is that we not abandon Iraq to al Qaeda and Iran, so long as victory there is still possible.


And I conclude from my visit that victory is still possible in Iraq--thanks to the Iraqi majority that desperately wants a better life, and because of the courage, compassion and competence of the extraordinary soldiers and statesmen who are carrying the fight there, starting with Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. The question now is, will we politicians in Washington rise to match their leadership, sacrifices and understanding of what is on the line for us in Iraq--or will we betray them, and along with them, America's future security?

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Sadamists and QAEDA media and web sites are talking about a Alsader Mehdi Army counter attack on their bases. I don't know if that is a real development on ground though.


Having a web site like basrah.net with very strong ties to Sadamist, claiming that Amehdi army put a sunni Mosque on fire in Moqdadia, is by itself a lot of news. Almoqdadia is in the heart of Diala province "where the islamic state of Qaeda" is located. No government or US troops are able to freely tour through that province, at a time Amehdi Arami is accused of buring a mosque.. There are two explanation, either Mehdi Army realy chose to act alone in protecting their communities and retaliat on Qaeda under the full failiar of governement to do it's job. Or , the terrorists are scared of the new Diala "Sahwa" council among the Sunni and Shia tribes to fight back.. So they want to create a confusion.. In any case , admiting of any anti Qaeda activity, is by it self a lot to hear in the heart land of Sadamists



أضرمت عناصر من مليشيات جيش المهدي الطائفية مسلحة النار في جامع السلام في منطقة العزي شرق المقدادية عصر اليوم. وقال مصدر حكومي إن المليشيات المسلحة قامت بإحراق الجامع ومحتوياته في منطقة العزي ".

وأضاف :" إن عددا من العوائل هجرت المنطقة بعد تهديدها من قبل المليشيات".

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But if the surge has done little to curb the terrorist attacks of Sunni extremist groups like al-Qaeda, which is blamed for both Samarrra bombings, it seems to have had a dampening effect on Shi'ite rage. Few Mahdi Army fighters have the stomach for confrontation with the Americans. They have not forgotten that the last time they went toe-toe with the U.S. military — in Najaf in 2004 — they were thoroughly and easily beaten.


Have a look to the abve.. As if the writer is upset for not having Amehdi Army retaliat .. He might indirectly trying to push the Mehdi fighters to confront the Americans " the one who are protecting Sunnis".. So bitty

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I got this essay of wisdom from an American friend..




> >Two traveling angels stopped to spend the night in the home of a


> >family.

> >

> >The family was rude and refused to let the angels stay in the mansion's


> >guest room.

> >

> >Instead the angels were given a small space in the cold basement.

> >

> >As they made their bed on the hard floor, the older angel saw a hole in


> >wall and repaired it.

> >

> >When the younger angel asked why, the older angel replied, "Things


> >always what they seem."

> >

> >The next night the pair came to rest at the house of a very poor, but


> >hospitable farmer and his wife.

> >

> >After sharing what little food they had the couple let the angels sleep


> >their bed where they could have a good night's rest.

> >

> >When the sun came up the next morning the angels found the farmer and


> >wife in tears.

> >

> >Their only cow, whose milk had been their sole income, lay dead in the

> >field.

> >

> >The younger angel was infuriated and asked the older angel how could


> >have let this happen?

> >

> >The first man had everything, yet you helped him, she accused.

> >

> >The second family had little but was willing to share everything, and


> >let the cow die.

> >

> >"Things aren't always what they seem," the older angel replied.

> >

> >"When we stayed in the basement of the mansion, I noticed there was


> >stored in that hole in the wall.

> >

> >Since the owner was so obsessed with greed and unwilling to share his


> >fortune, I sealed the

> >wall so he wouldn't find it."

> >

> >"Then last night as we slept in the farmers bed, the angel of death


> >for his wife. I gave him the cow instead.

> >

> >Things aren't always what they seem."

> >

> >Sometimes that is exactly what happens when things don't turn out the


> >they should. If you have faith, you just need to trust that every out


> >is always to your advantage. You just might not know it until some


> >later...> > Oooo

> >Some people ( )

> >come into our lives ) /

> >and quickly go.. (_ /

> >

> >

> > oooO

> > ( ) Some people

> > \ ( become friends

> > \_ ) and stay awhile....

> >

> >Leaving beautiful Oooo

> >footprints on our ( )

> >hearts... ) /

> > ( _/

> >

> > oooO

> > ( ) And we are never

> > \ ( quite the same

> > \_ ) because we have

> > made a good friend!!

> >

> >Yesterday is history.

> >Tomorrow a mystery.

> >Today is a gift.

> >That's why it's called the present!

> >

> >Life is special...

> >live and savor every moment in its flow...

> >it is not a dress rehearsal, it is the real show!

> >

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I wrote


In a rather strange interview , Iraqi web site ALMALEF "The file" quated Shiekh Awss Alkhfagee saying that Iranian intelligence is setting a station in Emara city that is responsible for the latest instability in TheeQar province to blame the Sadrees for being responsible. Mr. Alkhfagee is prominent Sadre leader and Muqtada special envoy that was captured by the British forces on his arrival from Syria at Basra airport. last month He was later released by the US forces. He claimed that the Americans was asking him of any possible rule in the new coming era and that they told him that they are planning to remove Almaliki government . he accused some fellow Shia groups of pushing for his capture on a baseless accusation, but Maliki intervene was behind his release.


Have a look to the news, seems there is the two rivals "Alsadrees and Coalition " are in synch, at least in this


BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Coalition raids aimed at disrupting the flow of weapons and fighters between Iraq and Iran resulted in the deaths of at least 20 militants early Monday in eastern Iraq, according to a statement from the U.S. military.


Coalition aircraft were called in to strafe fighters who attacked coalition troops in Amara and Majjar al-Kabir, two Shiite cities in the Maysan province bordering Iran, the military said.

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