Was dismissing the old army a mistake?

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The Iraqi assembly disolve the the Bremer's committee of debaathification and appoint a new one.

There is new regulations where the old Sadamist oparty leaders "100 thousands" to be delt in two groups.. those who are not in the security police and close to saddam , they be put on retierment until they got clearance , those who are committing crimes will be prosecuted.

 

Interstingly 62% of the baathists were from the Shia governates . That is might give some questions to those who keep saying that the current terrorist acts is because of debaathification!

 

 

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هيئة اجتثاث البعث) تعلن حل نفسها

السبت 21/5/2005 "الحياة" بغداد ـ سؤدد الصالحي -حلّت «الهيئة الوطنية العليا لاجتثاث البعث»، نفسها بعدما حجبت الجمعية الوطنية الثقة عن أعضائها وشكلت لجنة جديدة، تتولى اتخاذ القرارات ومراقبة أداء المديريات التنفيذية التابعة للهيئة والسعي لاستصدار التعديلات اللازمة لتسهيل عملها داخل الجمعية الوطنية.

وأوضح علي فيصل اللامي، المدير العام للهيئة، لـ»الحياة» انه تتم الآن مناقشة «الوضع القانوني للجنة الاجتثاث والتي تشكلت بموجب قراري مجلس الحكم العراقي المنحل وحصلت على صلاحياتها بموجب الأمر الاداري الصادر عن رئيس الادارة الاميركية السابق بول بريمر الذي خولها اصدار القرارات واتخاذ الاجراءات اللازمة للعمل لتنفيذ ما جاء في قانون الاجتثاث». ولفت إلى ان «الجمعية الوطنية باتت هي المسؤولة عن تحديد الجهة الرقابية على أعمال الهيئة».

وأكد اللامي ان «أعضاء اللجنة القديمة في انتظار الاجتماع مع أعضاء اللجنة الجديدة لاطلاعهم على ما نفذته الهيئة حتى الآن»، لافتاً إلى ان «المديريات التنفيذية داخل الهيئة في حاجة إلى استصدار تعديلات على قانون الاجتثاث».

وأشار إلى ان التعديل المطلوب، يتمثل في «احالة أعضاء قيادات الفرق على التقاعد، بدلاً من فصلهم ادارياً، مع احتفاظهم بحق العودة إلى الوظيفة، وشدّد، على ان هذا الاجراء يكفل لعائلة عضو قيادة الفرقة التمتع بالراتب التقاعدي، طوال الفترة المقررة للبت في طلب السماح له بالعودة إلى وظيفته».

وأكد المدير العام للهيئة ان أعضاء حزب البعث المشمولين بقرار الاجتثاث، لا يزيدون عن 100 ألف، من أصل مليوني بعثي، وان 80 في المئة من هؤلاء، هم أعضاء قيادات الفرق والأعضاء المشمولون بالاجراء، وهم يمتلكون حق العودة إلى وظائفهم في حال عدم ثبوت تورطهم بجرائم الى جانب 5 آلاف آخرين، هم من أعضاء الشُعب وهؤلاء سيحالون على التقاعد. أما العدد الباقي (بين 12-14 ألفاً)، فهم «أزلام النظام السابق»، اي انهم العاملون في أجهزة الحماية الخاصة والمرافقون والقياديون في أجهزة المخابرات وجهاز الأمن الخاص، وهؤلاء «سيفقدون جميع حقوقهم وسيحالون إلى القضاء»، مشيراً إلى ان 62 في المئة من المشمولين بالاجتثاث، ينحدرون من المناطق الجنوبية ذات الغالبية الشيعية.

[salim]

The military officers of Sadam's party organization is proud of attacking the family of the sister of the Sadam court's judge Aluraibi. Her hasband and 7 years old son were killed and she is wounded by the attack .. The criminal "officers" attacked the family while they embarking their car in fornt of their house in Gazalia " a hostile discrit in west Baghdad which is considered as play ground for Sadam and Qaeda terrorists..

Just imagine if these " officers" are still running the new Iraqi army, would we dare talking about a success in Iraq?

 

غزة-دنيا الوطن

 

أعلنت احدى منظمات حزب البعث المنحل مسؤوليتها عن اغتيال زوج وابن شقيقة القاضي محمد العريبي وقد جاء في بيان وزع اليوم في عدد من مناطق بغداد وتكريت ورد فيه بان (( قيادة ذي قار التابعة للجناح العسكري لحزب البعث تعلن مسؤوليتها عن القصاص العادل لافراد من عائلة العميل محمد العريبي مجيد الخليفة الذي نصبه الاحتلال الاميركي قاضيا في المحكمة اللاشرعية ، تلك المهزلة التي يحاكمونها بها الرفيق القائد وفارس الامة البطل السيد الرئيس صدام حسين....))، بحسب نص البيان ، وقد توعد البيان القاضي الخليفة بالقصاص وكذلك القصاص من كل من تسول له نفسه المساس بحرية وكرامة شخص الرئيس المخلوع صدام حسين ...

ويبدو ان الحادث جاء ردا على الحدة في التعامل التي ابداها القاضي محمد العريبي مجيد الخليفة مع الرئيس المخلوع صدام حسين في محاكمته عن قضية الانفال ..

وقد سبق لمصادر الشرطة ان اعلنت بوقت مبكر بان مجهولين يستقلون سيارة مدنية كانوا يترصدون زوج شقيقة القاضي الخليفة ،ويدعى كاظم عبد الحسين / 39 عاما ،وفتحوا النار عليه مساء يوم أمس الخميس أمام منزله في احدى احياء العاصمة بغداد وهو حي الغزالية الواقع غرب المدينة فأردوه قتيلا مع ولده الصغير البالغ من العمر 7 سنوات طفله الذي لقي حتفه ايضا .

وكان القاضي محمد عريبي الخليفة اختير لرئاسة المحكمة التي تنظر بقضية الأنفال خلفا للقاضي عبد الله علوش العامري ، وكان القاضي الخليفة قد بدأ أول جلسة له في القضية بطرد صدام حسين من قاعة المحكمة إثر اعتراضه على انتداب محامين للدفاع عنه بعد إنسحاب فريق الدفاع الموكل إحتجاجا على قرار إقصاء القاضي العامري ، ثم كرر الطرد لصدام وعدد من اعوانه في الجلسة اللاحقة ..

 

 

جميع الحقوق محفوظة لدنيا الوطن © 2003 -

[bdlwet]

So Questions of dismissing the regular army when Condaleeza Rice and Rumsfeld were diagreeing now come back to haunt the American administration. With the latest offer from Al-maliki to welcome back to the Iraqui army the former Baathists; does this not become a blank check to Sunni complicities in insurgency. The recent quiet in attacks in Najaf may just be a lever used by Sunni minority to regain some military control ere the Mahdi-ists get a larger political voice.

I see the Turkish positions on Kurd insugency in Turkey must bring Iraq to the bargaining table.

In my mind, if not for the violence, this could be a wonderful opportunity to lever more support from extremists for the centrist Shia elements in the political process. Getting a hand on the rivalries that undermine the political process is a necessary process in becoming a civilian governing country. If the people involved in supporting the violence understood how much this is costing them, in resources, in overall strength of parties, in unification abilitiies and last, but not least in the real cost of lives that are such an important part of the tapestry of culture that Iraq used to be I have no doub6t they might buy into the political process more. It behooves the media and the public to re-invigorate the search for a constitutilonal melding of the three ethnic cultures involved. I sometimes wish more Iraquis could visit a true democratic country during an election to see how tghis could be done less violently.

But good luck integrating Baathists back into the army...might be a bloody process.

[salim]

Bdlwet,

Almaliki didn't call back the former Baathists, he called the former Iraqi Army personnels. He emphasised that baath party has no chance in the Iraq political arena. The personnals might be forced to enroll in the Baath paty during Sadam times , but as all Iraqis knew, such erollment was nothing but kind of procedural . Just like admitting your documents to get the job.

What went wrong was not the dismiss of the army, it was the late in rebuilding the new one. Getting the former Iraqi Aramy officers back was always the policy, the issue was to check those who want to get back.

What is new with Maliki call is to build another army of reserve that can accomodate the whole one million former army personnals , specially those who don't find job with the active one. As for those who don't like to join, they can access thier rights in tretirement benefits, which is a generous package to thr Iraqi standards. This plan is mainly to isolate those afrmy members from the Baath party influences, giving them all options to participate in the new Iraq .

The problem with Sadamists is not to share responsibilties, the issue is with their dreams of gtting sole control.

[salim]

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/06/opinion/06bremer.html

How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army

 

 

By L. PAUL BREMER III

Published: September 6, 2007

“The Iraqi Army of the future cannot be an extension of the present army, which has been made into a tool of dictatorship.” — Report by the Department of State’s Future of Iraq Project, May 2002

 

IT has become conventional wisdom that the decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s army was a mistake, was contrary to American prewar planning and was a decision I made on my own. In fact the policy was carefully considered by top civilian and military members of the American government. And it was the right decision.

 

By the time Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003, the Iraqi Army had simply dissolved. On April 17 Gen. John Abizaid, the deputy commander of the Army’s Central Command, reported in a video briefing to officials in Washington that “there are no organized Iraqi military units left.” The disappearance of Saddam Hussein’s old army rendered irrelevant any prewar plans to use that army. So the question was whether the Coalition Provisional Authority should try to recall it or to build a new one open to both vetted members of the old army and new recruits. General Abizaid favored the second approach

 

They recognized that to recall the former army was a practical impossibility because postwar looting had destroyed all the bases.

Moreover, the largely Shiite draftees of the army were not going to respond to a recall plea from their former commanders, who were primarily Sunnis. It was also agreed that recalling the army would be a political disaster because to the vast majority of Iraqis it was a symbol of the old Baathist-led Sunni ascendancy.

 

 

Meanwhile, Walter Slocombe’s consultations with Americans officials in Washington and Baghdad showed that they understood that the only viable course was to build a new, professional force open to screened members of the old army. Mr. Slocombe drafted an order to accomplish these objecti

 

Moreover, we were right to build a new Iraqi Army. Despite all the difficulties encountered, Iraq’s new professional soldiers are the country’s most effective and trusted security force. By contrast, the Baathist-era police force, which we did recall to duty, has proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi people it is supposed to protect.

[tajer]

Civil-Military Relations in Iraq (1921-2006): An Introductory Survey

Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 5 (May 2006)

by Abbas Kadhim

 

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2006/May/kadhimMay06.asp

[tajer]

Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History (Middle Eastern Military Studies) (Hardcover)

by Ibra al-Marashi (Author)

 

 

 

Editorial Reviews

 

Product Description

 

Iraqs Armed Forces: An Analytical History presents a comprehensive study of the evolution of the Iraqi military from the British mandate era to post-Saddam Iraq.

 

Despite its prominent role in three major conflicts, no single, comprehensive work on the Iraqi forces has been published before. This new book is key to understanding Iraq today and also makes a major contribution to the field of civil-military relations. Based on captured Iraqi military documents from the 1991 Gulf War, this research was allegedly plagiarized by the British government prior to the 2003 Iraq war. It shows how the Iraqi armed forces, at one time the worlds fourth largest military, engaged in the longest conventional war in the twentieth century and challenged a superpower on two separate occasions.

 

Ibrahim al-Marashi shows how the insecurity that plagued Iraq after the 2003 Iraq war can be attributed to the failure to create a new military that does not serve as a threat to a future government, yet is strong enough to deter rival factions in Iraq. As the US is mired in the reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq, reconstituting its armed forces will be a prerequisite for an American withdrawal from Iraq. While the Bush administration praises the progress of the new Iraqi army, immense challenges lay ahead, as these forces are being built from scratch in the middle of an intense insurgency.

 

 

This book will be of immense interest to all students of the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, Middle East studies, and of military and strategic studies in general.

 

 

[salim]

http://aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&am...;article=518522

 

 

 

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