Iraq War Logs

[salim]

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[tajer]

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يمكن تنزيل النسخه الكامله للوثائق المنشوره من اي منها

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[tajer]

تقرير من النجف في سنه 2009

 

تنامي مشاعر التخوف من النفوذ الايراني

 

 

 

 

http://wikileaks.as50620.net/cable/2009/12...AGHDAD3195.html

 

Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD3195, IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF

 

¶1. © SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf's social,

economic, political and military circles discussed with

Post's Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of

Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia

clerical establishment (Marja'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah

Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province's

farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized

produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a

premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an

influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi

political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary

of Sistani's social and political clout among Shias, notably

in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah's rejection of the Iranian

regime's adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END

SUMMARY

 

¶2. © During a recent visit to Najaf, local interlocutors,

including the province's head of military intelligence; the

chairman of the Provincial Council; a well-connected Shia

businessman; the president of the farmer's union; the chief

judge of the province; and a representative of the local

Chamber of Commerce shared their views on the state of

political and economic development in the province and Iran's

role.

 

Provincial Council Chairman

---------------------------

 

¶3. © Sheikh Fayedh al-Shimerri, the Chairman of Najaf's

Provincial Council, a religious cleric turned politician and

member of Maliki's State of Law coalition asserted that

Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly

frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq's

neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the

biggest culprits, but noted that a "mental revolution" was

underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to

undermine the country's stability, pointing to such trends in

Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and

Mosul against the Turks.

 

¶4. © Al-Shimerri echoed other interlocutors' concerns

about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a

political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed

the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition

comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and

the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI's

image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.

 

¶5. © Al-Shimerri expressed concerns about rumors

circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist

conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless

rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship.

(NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also

mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held

in Washington in February. END NOTE).

 

Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down

----------------------------

 

¶6. © Major Uday, a provincial military intelligence

officer and Maliki supporter, described Iran as a threat to

Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government's

(IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order

to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for

its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq's

potential influence in the region, and will continue to

support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine

Iraq. "Iran does not offer its support for free," Uday

noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in

exchange for Iranian support.

 

¶7. © Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at

Q7. © Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at

least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is

dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining

the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security

institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill

key security positions with their own supporters, many of

whom are unprofessional and sectarian, Uday cautioned. The

Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to

maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to

Uday. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties

against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran's hit

list (NOTE: According to Uday, Iran had already assassinated

180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).

 

¶8. © Uday also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements

often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of

supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism

unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He

asserted that Najaf's police chief, Abd Al-Karim (aka Abu

Ahmad Al-Miyahi), is a "former" member of Badr with dubious

loyalties. Najaf's chief justice, Kareem Faroon, a

well-respected judge also alleged that the Iraqi police were

responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in

November. "He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is

still part of the militia (Badr)," Judge Faroon asserted.

 

Sistani: "What Do the Americans Want?"

----QDI>RpQd%'MkQQto pulse the cleric on

his views about matters of political consequence. Kelanter

explained that Sistani's son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the

main conduit of information between his father whenever a

religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia

imams in the country.

 

¶12. © Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll

in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG

infiltration, Kelanter asserted. Kelanter himself is

suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams

of the holy Abbas and Husayn shrines in Karbala, Shaykhs

Karbal'aie and Safi, were "in the pocket of the Iranians",

despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.

 

The Sadrists

------------

 

¶13. © Regarding the Sadrists, Kelanter recalled fondly his

time as a student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada

Al-Sadr's father), commenting that, unlike his radical son,

the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He

Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He

criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his

father's legacy. Al-Shimmeri also praised the efforts of

Sadr's father and sought to distinguish between "good" and

"bad" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr's father.

Major Uday believes the Sadrists are politically weak and

continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own

groups. (NOTE: Major Uday believes Al-Shimmari is a closet

Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki's coalition.

Al-Shimmari commented that the Iranians had told the wayward

Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).

 

 

Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare

--------------------------------------------- --

 

¶14. © Jabar Al-Garawi, the head of Najaf's Farmers' Union

commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his

increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in

improving security. However, he complained that Iran and

Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by

flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce

that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.

 

¶15. © Iraq's neighbors were pursuing such measures in

order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling

the continued success of Iraq's new democracy, Al-Garawi

alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water

shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels,

outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted.

Al-Garawi confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had

recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into

Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60

percent of Najaf's labor force works in agriculture. The

sector is the province's most important revenue generating

industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).

 

¶16. © Samira Al-Halawi, an outspoken female member of the

Najaf Chamber of Commerce, having recently returned from a

USG-sponsored visitors program in the U.S., railed against

Iran's pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that

many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in

the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians.

She also criticized Iraqi politicians "for being ignorant

and overly-reliant on clerics" for their political welfare.

 

COMMENT

-------

 

¶17. © Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries

significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to

expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The

city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to

profit spiritually and financially from the city's religious

and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and

acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran's influence,

albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into

mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran

will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order

to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of

its ability to influence the ways of the Marja'iyyah are more

limited, particularly during Sistani's tenure, given the

clerical establishment's unrivaled theocratic and geographic

prominence when compared to its "sister city" Qom.

HILL

[tajer]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002562

 

SIPDIS

 

EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2019

TAGS PGOV, PREL, IZ

SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS

NEIGHBORS, PART I

 

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.

 

¶1. (U) This is the first of two cables reviewing Iraq’s relations with key neighboring states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey, in the wake of the August 19 bombings. Part II reviews Iraq’s relations with Syria, in the wake of the August 19 bombings.

 

¶2. © Summary: Iraq’s relations with its neighbors represent a critical element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and normalize its position in the Gulf and the broader region. While Iraq made substantial progress in 2008-09 on these fronts, there remained unfinished business, especially in terms of relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria. The August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension Iraq’s improving relations with its neighbors -- represent a serious setback to that progress and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in particular now view those earlier gains as “reversible.” Iraq views relations with Saudi Arabia as among its most challenging, given Riyadh’s money, deeply ingrained anti-Shia attitudes, and suspicions that a Shia-led Iraq will inevitably further Iranian regional influence. Iraqi contacts assess that the Saudi goal (and that of most other Sunni Arab states, to vary degrees) is to enhance Sunni influence, dilute Shia dominance and promote the formation of a weak and fractured Iraqi government. Coincidentally, Iranian efforts are driven by a clear determination to see a sectarian, Shia-dominated government that is weak, disenfranchised from its Arab neighbors, detached from the U.S. security apparatus and strategically dependent on Iran. Neither of these objectives is in the U.S. interest. In the longer term, we will need to flesh out ideas for a post-GCC security architecture that includes Iraq more fully, develops ways to contain Iranian regional influence, and shapes the special position Iraq will likely occupy in the Gulf in ways that further our interests and those of our Gulf partners. End Summary.

 

SAUDI ARABIA -- ANTI-SHIISM AS FOREIGN POLICY?

--------------------------------------------- -

 

¶3. © Iraqi officials view relations with Saudi Arabia as among their most problematic, although they are usually careful with U.S. officials to avoid overly harsh criticism, given our close relations with the Saudis. Iraqi officials note that periodic anti-Shia outbursts from Saudi religious figures are often allowed to circulate without sanction or disavowal from the Saudi leadership. This reality reinforces the Iraqi view that the Saudi state religion of Wahabbi Sunni Islam condones religious incitement against Shia. The suspicion is that these anti-Shia attitudes color Saudi views of a Shia-led Iraq. The Saudis have traditionally viewed Iraq as a Sunni-dominated bulwark against the spread of Shiism and Iranian political influence. In the wake of bombings in predominantly Shia areas across the country in June 2009 that killed dozens, PM Maliki pointed publicly to one such statement, made by a Saudi imam in May, and noted, “We have observed that many governments have been suspiciously silent on the fatwa provoking the killing of Shiites.”

 

¶4. © For now the Saudis are using their money and media power XXXXXXXXXXXX to support Sunni political aspirations, exert influence over Sunni tribal groups, and undercut the Shia-led Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Iraqi National Alliance (INA). NSC advisor QIraq (ISCI) and Iraqi National Alliance (INA). NSC advisor Safa al-Sheikh told us recently that Saudi influence in Iraq was significant, perhaps more significant than Iran’s at the moment, given the financial and media assets at its disposal, and given Iran’s recent internal distractions. He described the Saudi “media message” as having shifted a few years ago from one that was hostile to the GOI and sympathetic to the insurgency, to one that focused now more on an anti-ISCI message. According to PM Advisor Sadiq al-Rikabi, the Saudis are opposed to a strong Shia-led INA. Al-Sheikh also assessed that the Saudis would try to curb ISCI and INA and throw support to Sunni groups to counter Iranian influence, steps that could end up indirectly supporting Maliki, if he continues to pursue a cross-sectarian coalition in the elections. These contacts assess that the Saudi goal (and to varying degrees most other Sunni states) is to enhance Sunni influence, dilute Shia dominance, and promote the formation of a weak and more fractured Iraqi government. (COMMENT: Coincidentally, Iran also sees as in its interest a weak Iraqi government, albeit one with Shia firmly in control.)

 

¶5. © Some observers see a more malign Saudi influence. A recent Iraqi press article quoted anonymous Iraqi intelligence sources assessing that Saudi Arabia was leading a Gulf effort to destabilize the Maliki government and was

 

BAGHDAD 00002562 002 OF 003

financing “the current al Qaida offensive in Iraq.” The article also quoted MP Haidar al-Abadi, a Maliki political ally, insisting that Gulf Arab neighbors wanted to destabilize Iraq. A few of our more senior contacts hint at similar malign intentions “by some neighbors,” making clear without being explicit that they are referring to Saudi Arabia.

 

KUWAIT: RELATIONS HOSTAGE TO CHAPTER VII CONCERNS

--------------------------------------------- ----

 

¶6. © Although Kuwait re-opened its Embassy and sent an ambassador in 2008, bilateral relations remain hostage to Chapter VII concerns. While the Kuwaitis have indicated some willingness to reduce significantly the amount of compensation Iraq is paying under UNSCR 687, they have insisted in return on GOI re-affirmation in its entirety of UNSCR 833, entailing acceptance of the land borders and maritime boundary between the two countries. The latter in particular is highly problematic for the Iraqi leadership, especially in an election year, according to senior contacts. At present, Iraq has unimpeded navigational access from the Gulf to the port of Um Qasr, but some two-thirds of the deep water channel of the Khor Abdullah now lies -- as a result of the 833 demarcation -- in Kuwaiti territorial waters. Some observers, such as Da’wa Party MP Sami al-Askari, have expressed concern to us that after U.S. forces withdraw fully, Kuwait will try to control Iraq’s access to the sea, “and that border demarcation will allow it.” In his view, “No Iraqi leader could ever formally recognize the maritime border.” Even PM Maliki believes this. Despite these difficulties, the Iraqi and Kuwaiti sides have made significant progress cooperating in the past six months on Kuwaiti missing persons and property. NSC advisor al-Sheikh believes that the Chapter VII issues with Kuwait will eventually be resolved and that “we do not consider Kuwait a problem country” like some of the other neighbors. Nevertheless, the border issue is an acute friction point and could, in the view of Maliki, become grounds for confrontation between the two.

 

IRAN’S LOOMING PRESENCE

-----------------------

 

¶7. © Iranian influence in Iraq remains pervasive, as Tehran manipulates a range of levers to mold Iraq’s political, religious, social, and economic landscape. Overall, however, the GOI views its relations with Iran in a special category, posing risks that are manageable and not viewed as existential threats to the state. Obviously many Sunni contacts -- and many of our allies in the region -- see the situation in far starker terms and fear that Iraq could fall into Iran’s political orbit and rendered unable to speak or act independently, once U.S. troops draw down. Iranian efforts are driven by a clear determination to see a sectarian, Shia-dominated government that is weak, disenfranchised from its Arab neighbors, detached from the U.S. security apparatus and strategically dependent on Iran.

 

¶8. © While significantly weaker than the Saudis and others on media, the Iranians fund political parties and key individuals (as other neighboring countries do), according to a range of well-informed Iraqi contacts. Shia contacts like PM advisor Rikabi and NSC advisor al-Sheikh, as well as others such as (Kurdish) FM Zebari, do not dismiss the significant Iranian influence but instead argue that it:

-- is best countered by Iraqi Shia political actors, who know how to deal with Iran;

-- is not aimed, unlike that of some Sunni Arab neighbors, at fomenting terrorism that would destabilize the government; Qfomenting terrorism that would destabilize the government;

-- will naturally create nationalistic Iraqi resistance to it (both Shia and more broadly), if other outsiders do not intervene to stoke Sunni-Shia sectarian tension; and

-- has been frozen in place to some extent in the past few months by the political turmoil inside Iran.

 

¶9. © According to al-Sheikh, Iraq and Iran have “very special, very frank talks” in which Iraq’s Shia-led government is able to push back effectively against Iranian influence on some fronts. Observers generally credit the Iranians with playing a more sophisticated game than the Syrians, as they try to shape the political process to their liking. These contacts acknowledge that Iran is providing some form of covert support to armed groups like the Promise Day Brigades and other small groups, but maintain they have stopped support for the big militias. It should be noted that some contacts demonstrate discomfort when asked about Iranian influence and show an alacrity for moving on to other

 

BAGHDAD 00002562 003 OF 003

neighbors in the region. TURKEY: BETTER THAN THE REST

----------------------------

 

¶10. © Relations with Turkey are relatively positive. Turkey intervened diplomatically to attempt to mediate the post-August 19 crisis with the Syrians, and unlike the Iranian effort, seems to have gotten some traction with the parties. The effort has been well-received here, even if concrete progress has been limited. The Iraqis and Turks have established a Strategic Commission that meets periodically at the ministerial level, paving the way for head of state visits marking significant economic cooperation. PM Erdogan is expected in Baghdad in October, following up on the ministerial in mid-September in Ankara. Bilateral trade is currently at $7 billion annually, and the two countries hope it will expand significantly in the coming decade. Moreover, Turkey has worked to improve its relations with the KRG, and they have significantly increased their diplomatic and commercial presence in the Kurdish areas. However, the Turks also have been active on the Iraqi political front, funding groups like the Mosul-based Sunni Al-Hudba movement, in an effort to offset Kurd influence in areas outside Kurdistan.

 

¶11. © It is the water issue that threatens to complicate an improving Iraq-Turkey relationship. According to DFM Labid Abbawi, Iraq needs a flow of 700 cubic meters of water for its needs but could get back with a minimum of 500. However, Turkey was only allowing a flow of about 230 cubic meters (with an uptick in August and September beyond that level). A recent visit to Turkey by the Iraqi Minister of Water was not very productive, he noted.

 

THE WAY FORWARD

---------------

 

¶12. © It will help Iraq’s efforts to maintain stability and security, and to continue moving forward in normalization with neighbors, if we and the P-5 can provide the requisite support for the appointment by the UN of a senior official (someone other than SRSG head Melkert, who already has a full plate with UNAMI) to look into the August 19 bombings. We should also weigh in with key neighbors to urge a redoubling of efforts in normalizing relations with Iraq, keeping up the pressure on Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular to return their Ambassadors. We should also caution Iraq’s Arab neighbors against efforts to inflame Shia-Sunni anxieties through their support for Sunni parties and by Shia-critical media attacks. Regarding Kuwait, we will need to work for steady progress on Chapter VII where possible, focusing on Oil-for-Food and WMD resolutions 1546 and 707, initially, with a push after elections to make progress on the Kuwait-related resolutions.

 

¶13. © In the longer term, we will need to flesh out ideas for a post-GCC security architecture that includes Iraq more fully, develops ways to contain Iranian regional influence, and shapes the special position Iraq will likely occupy in the Gulf in ways that further our interests and those of our Gulf partners. The challenge for us is to convince Iraq neighbors, particularly the Sunni Arab governments, that relations with a new Iraq are not a zero-sum game, where if Iraq wins, they lose. We still have work to do to convince them that a strong, stable, democratic (and inevitably Shia-led) Iraq is the best guarantee that Iraq will be able to shake Iranian manipulation and see its future bound up with that of the West and its moderate Arab neighbors.

HILL

[tajer]

وثيقه توضح طبيعه تناقض السر والعلن في تصرفات الاسره الحاكمه السعوديه

 

. © Summary: Behind the facade of Wahabi conservatism in the streets, the underground nightlife for Jeddah's elite youth is thriving and throbbing. The full range of worldly temptations and vices are available -- alcohol, drugs, sex -- but strictly behind closed doors. This freedom to indulge carnal pursuits is possible merely because the religious police keep their distance when parties include the presence or patronage of a Saudi royal and his circle of loyal attendants, such as a Halloween event attended by ConGenOffs on. [DETAIL REMOVED] Over the past few years, the increased conservatism of Saudi Arabia's external society has pushed the nightlife and party scene in Jeddah even further underground. End summary.

 

Elite party like the rest of the world,

---------------------------------------

 

just underground

-----------------

 

¶2. © Along with over 150 young Saudis (men and women mostly in their 20's and early 30's), ConGenOffs accepted invitations to an underground Halloween party at PrinceXXXXXXXXXXXX residence in Jeddah on XXXXXXXXXXXX. Inside the gates, past the XXXXXXXXXXXX security guards and after the abaya coat-check, the scene resembled a nightclub anywhere outside the Kingdom: plentiful alcohol, young couples dancing, a DJ at the turntables, and everyone in costume. Funding for the party came from a corporate sponsor, XXXXXXa U.S.-based energy-drink company as well as from the princely host himself.

 

Royalty, attended by "khawi," keep religious police at bay

--------------------------------------------- -------------

 

¶3. © Religious police/CPVPV (Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) were nowhere to be seen and while admission was controlled through a strictly-enforced guest list, the partygoers were otherwise not shy about publicizing the affair. According to a young Saudi from a prominent Jeddah merchant family, the Saudis try to throw parties at princes' houses or with princes in attendance, which serves as sufficient deterrent to interference by the CPVPV. There are over 10,000 princes in the Kingdom, albeit at various levels and gradations -- "Royal Highnesses" ("Saheb Al Sumou Al Maliki") signified by direct descent from King Abdulaziz, and mere "Highnesses" ("Saheb Al Sumou") from less direct branches of the Al Saud ruling family. Our host that evening,xxxxxx (protect), traces his roots to Thunayan, a brother of Mohammad, Amir of Diriyyah and Nejd (1725-65), King Abdullah's direct ancestor, six generations back. Although PrinceXXXXXXXXXXXX is XXXXXXXXXXXX not in line for the throne, he still enjoys the perks of a mansion, luxury car, lifetime stipend, and security entourage. (Note: Most of the prince XXXXXXXXXXXX's security forces were young XXXXXXXXXXXX men. It is common practice for Saudi princes to grow up with hired bodyguards from Nigeria or other African nations who are of similar age and who remain with the prince well into adulthood. They are called "khawi," derived from the Arabic word "akh," meaning "brother." The lifetime spent together creates an intense bond of loyalty. End note.)

 

Availability of black market alcohol, prostitutes, and drugs

--------------------------------------------- ---------------

 

¶4. © Alcohol, though strictly prohibited by Saudi law and custom, was plentiful at the party's well-stocked bar, well-patronized by Halloween revellers. The hired Filipino bartenders served a cocktail punch using "sadiqi," a locally-made "moonshine." While top-shelf liquor bottles were on display throughout the bar area, the original contents were reportedly already consumed and replaced by sadiqi. On the black market, a bottle of Smirnoff can cost 1,500 riyals when available, compared to 100 riyals for the locally-made vodka. It was also learned through word-of-mouth that a number of the guests were in fact "working girls," not uncommon for such parties.

JEDDAH 00000443 002.2 OF 002

Additionally, though not witnessed directly at this event, cocaine and hashish use is common in these social circles and has been seen on other occasions.

 

¶5. © Comment: Saudi youth get to enjoy relative social freedom and indulge fleshly pursuits, but only behind closed doors -- and only the rich. Parties of this nature and scale are believed to be a relatively recent phenomenon in Jeddah. One contact, a young Saudi male, explained that up to a few years ago, the only weekend activity was "dating" inside the homes of the affluent in small groups. It is not uncommon in Jeddah for the more lavish private residences to include elaborate basement bars, discos, entertainment centers and clubs. As one high society Saudi remarked, "The increased conservatism of our society over these past years has only moved social interaction to the inside of people's homes." End comment.

 

QUINN

[tajer]

 

 

الوثيقه ادناه في سنه 2009

عن لسان مستشار الامن العراقي الدكتور الربيعي ينقل رد مسوؤل ملف العراق في ايران

 

"ايران ام الشيعه في العالم, وعلى الجميع ان لايقولو افا للوالدين

 

"

 

http://wikileaks.as50620.net/cable/2009/01/09BAGHDAD197.html

 

 

 

In terms of atmospherics, Rubaie said all of his

interlocutors had been speaking from the same set of talking

points. They had all also had a binder of press clippings of

statements by Rubaie critical of Iran going back over the

past three years. Rubaie had responded that these statements

were reactions to Iran's continual squeezing of Iraq. In an

elaborate metaphor, he said he had told the Iranians that

there is an Arab proverb that when one steps on someone's

stomach, the victim involuntarily protests by exhaling.

Soleimani had responded that "Iran is the mother of all Shia

in the world" and had quoted back a Koranic proverb that "no

matter what one's parents do, a child should never criticize

them."

 

 

 

[tajer]

وثيقه تشرح دور السياحه الدينيه في كربلاء لزياده النفوذ الايراني لدى الرموز السياسيه من خلال اعطاء مقاولات شركه شمسه الايرانيه خدمه الزائرين لشخصيات

سياسيه معروفه

اسماء نواب و تجار واعضاء مجلس محافظه

كما تتطرق الوثيقه الى قصه المطعم الايراني المركزي الذي تم غلقه بعد شكوى القصابيين واصحاب المطاعم

 

 

 

 

http://wikileaks.as50620.net/cable/2008/09...AGHDAD2812.html

 

[quote]Shamsah's Agents

----------------

 

¶4. (S) Out of 170 hospitality enterprises (hotels,

restaurants, travel and tourism businesses) that applied to

Shamsah in 2007 for the opportunity to provide services to

Iranian visitors in Karbala, only six were selected

initially. Contacts report that Shamsah's primary agent is a

50-something former resident of Kut named Kareem al-Musawi.

He operates two tourism companies selected: Al-Diyar and

Al-Janoub. Described as motivated by money, he also owns

several hotels, a mineral water company, and a dairy. Some

of these businesses allegedly were financed by Tehran, along

with homes in the Islamic Republic that he visits regularly.

Al-Musawi is widely perceived here as having access to

"unlimited" Iranian funding. He distributes 10,000-dinar

(800 USD) "grants" to the poor and is believed to financially

support Provincial Council (PC) Acting Chairman Abd al-Al

al-Yasiri (ISCI), according to multiple contacts in local

government.

 

¶5. (S) Another important Shamsah agent is Mohammad al-Yakubi,

a Fadilah-affiliated PC member. He controls the Al-Rafideen

and Qasr al-Mustafa tourism companies here and is the uncle

of Hamoud Mohsen al-Yakubi, chairman of the National Tourism

Committee. A third Shamsah agent identified by our contacts

is Abd al-Kareem al-Unayzi, a Da'wa-affiliated member of the

Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR). He owns the Al-TafTravel Agency in Karbala. The sixth hospitality business

Shamsah selected is the Jarash Company; our contacts do not

know who owns it.

[tajer]

تقرير في بدايه سنه 2009

 

السيد اباد جمال الدين يحذر من تنامي النفوذ المخابراتي الايراني ويدعي حمله لرساله من ايه الله سعيد الحكيم يستنجد فيها من تعاظم هذا النفوذ

 

السيد يدعي ان المسؤوليين الشيعه يذهبون الى قم بمقابله جواد الشهرستاني الذي هو زوج ابنه الله السستاني ويدعي انه مسؤول العراق في المخابرات الايرانيه

وقدم اسم علي الدباغ كمثل

السيد دعى الى دعم المراجع الشيعه المناوءين لولابه الفقيه وضرب مثلا ايه الله علي الامين في لبنان

د

3. © Jamaleddin is among severl contacts who have

reached out to the Embassy recently to warn about Iranian

influence, which is a favorite topic of conversation among a

wide range of Iraqis. He claims to be carrying the message

of Ayatollah Muhammad Sayyid Al-Hakim, a potential heir to

Ayatollah Sistani and first cousin of Abdelaziz Al-Hakim,

head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the

political party closest to Iran. Despite Al-Hakim's ISCI

family ties, he urged Jamaladdin through an emissary to "go

to Washington, to Tel Aviv, anywhere" to seek help to stop

Iran,s nefarious project to subjugate Iraq, according to

Jamaleddin. Jamaleddin said he was surprised this message

was coming from the Ayatollah, but the emissary maintained

that Iran's aggressive efforts had struck terror into the

hearts of the entire Najafi clerical establishment.

 

¶4. © Specifically, Jamaleddin claimed to us that Iran is

paying "10,000" imams across southern Iraq $200 USD a month

to deliver Friday sermons that inspire the faithful with

righteous rhetoric and subtly include a positive gloss on

Iran. In our meeting February 11 and an earlier meeting

February 9, he repeated several times that he was not afraid

for himself or Iraq, but rather the whole region, claiming

that Iran is already controlling Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. He

emphasizing that the Khomeini ideology of

wilayat al-Faqih (jurisdiction of clerics) is "the most vile,

Satanic ideology" ever devised by man "it's much worse than

Nazism."

 

¶5. © As for Iraq, he said, every member of the Iraqi

cabinet who travels to Iran visits the religious center of

Qom to pay homage to Jawwad Shahristani, who he identified as

the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)

Qthe Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)

official responsible for Iraq. They go to Qom as if they are

going to pray at the Ka'ba (in Mecca), he said, citing in

particular GoI spokesman Ali Dabbagh. He added that

Shahristani is the son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Sistani and

head of Sistani's office in Qom.

 

¶6. © We pressed Jamaleddin on his contention that Iranian

influence in Iraq is increasing, noting that Iraq had signed

the Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement with

the USG despite Iranian opposition and that in visits to

Basra, for instance, we hear from many Iraqis who hate Iran

because of their memories of the Iran-Iraq war and, more

recently, Iranian-sponsored militia violence. He responded

that "they hate Iran, but they don't hate money." He

compared the Iran-Iraq relationship to the Syria-Lebanon

relationship, saying that Syria controls Lebanon even though

Lebanese are, like Iraqis,

strong and independent people who seek to be free from

foreign influence. Likewise we pressed Jamaleddin on his

 

BAGHDAD 00000383 002 OF 002

 

 

contention that Iran controls militias in southern Iraq,

noting that the violence has decreased from the period of a

year or two ago. He responded that Iranian-sponsored

militias have hidden weapons and retain the ability to rise

up if summoned by Iran.

 

¶7. © When asked what the appropriate USG response should

be, he urged us to stop "supporting" Iranian-sponsored

political parties such as ISCI. He did not dispute our

response that in fact the USG does not support any particular

party or politician, and in fact urged us to provide media

access to clerics who are willing to stand up to Iran. He

mentioned in particular a Lebanese cleric he identified as

Ayatollah Ali al-Amin.

[tajer]

وثيقه في شهر التاسع 2009

 

المالكي يعبر للسفير الامريكي عن استيائه الشديد من تزايد التدخل الايراني في شؤون الانتخابات العراقيه

 

المالكي يعتقد ان الايرانيين يستخدمون التدخل السعودي في تحشيد السنه كذريعه للمطالبه بتوحيد القائمتين الشيعيتين

ولكنه يرفض الضغوط للذهاب الى هذا الخيار لانه سوف يعمق الطائفيه

 

ويطالب الامريكان بالضغط على السعوديه لايقاف تدخلها في الشان الانتخابي

 

 

http://wikileaks.as50620.net/cable/2009/09...AGHDAD2569.html

(S) In a September 22 meeting, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri

al-Maliki told the Ambassador that Iran is intervening

increasingly boldly in the Iraqi political process in a bid

to "control the COR" (the Council of Representatives, the

Iraqi Parliament). Iran has not discarded use of military

means to attain its objectives, Maliki said, but for now it

is focusing on political means. If Iran does not succeed in

influencing the upcoming Iraqi national elections, Maliki

said, he expects to see them return to military actions.

Maliki said that the Iranian initiative was thwarted -- dealt

a "fatal blow" -- by Dawa's refusal to join the Shi,a

alliance being forged for the elections (the Iraqi National

Alliance). Iran, he said, is trying to rally the Shi'a to

counter the "Saudi project" to align the Sunni states. But

if Dawa had joined the Shi'a alliance, he said, that "could

have led to sectarian strife."

 

¶2. (S) Maliki said that Iran is using the Saudi efforts as

pretext to continue its intervention in Iraq. On September

21, for example, the Saudis sponsored a meeting in Amman at

which at least ten senior Iraqi Sunnis attended, including

Rafi al-Issawi. While in Washington, Maliki said, he asked

POTUS to intervene with Saudi Arabia to ask them to stop

their efforts at rallying the Sunni, in part precisely to

avoid inflaming sectarianism and to deny Iran that pretext

for similarly seeking to rally the Shi,a. Maliki's concerns

in this regard have not abated, he said. He chose not to

press this issue again with VPOTUS during his September 18

visit to Baghdad because he felt he had expressed his

concerns once and it was not necessary to continue to raise

the same issue.

[tajer]

وثيقه في شهر كانون الثاني 2010

السفاره: شيوخ العشائر لايمكن شراء ذممهم ولكن يمكن استاجارها

 

 

احد شيوخ العشائر في المثنى ينتقد السفاره الامريكيه في قله دعمها المالي للموالين من شيوخ العشائر في الجنوب الذين التقوا بوش في واشنطن اسوه بما فعلته مع شيوخ الانبار

الشيخ يقول ان الايرانيين اكثر سخائا ماديا وان الكثير من الشيوخ يترددون على طهران للعلاج وكذلك للاستجمام و للتمتع بالزواج المؤقت المنتشر هناك

 

الشيخ ينتقد دعم الامريكان للمالكي ويرى فيه زياده للنفوذ الايراني

تقرير السفاره يشير الى ان مواقف مشايخ عشائر العراق في الجنوب يمكن ايجارها ولكن ليس شرائها فهؤلاء معروفين تاريخيا بذهابهم حيث الاموال وانهم سريعوا التقلب مع تقلب مصادرها لذا فان الايرانيين لن يفعلوا افضل مما يفعل غيرهم

 

 

 

 

http://wikileaks.as50620.net/cable/2010/01/10BAGHDAD167.html

 

1. (U) This is a xxxxx reporting cable.

 

¶2. (S) SUMMARY: xxxxx met with local leader Sheikh xxxxx. During our lengthy discussions the

Sheikh shared his belief that the USG has poorly utilized its

influence in Iraq, leaving the way open for Iran to advance

its agenda at USG expense. He went on to describe Iranian

government attempts to buy his influence on a recent trip he

made to Iran. End Summary.

 

A new twist on &what happens in vegas, stays in vegas8

--------------------------------------------- ---------

¶3. (S) Sheikh xxxxx on January 13 to

discuss his recent trip to Iran. He told the xxxxx that he has

been courted by Iranian officials in an effort to garner more

support and influence among well-placed Iraqis in the middle

Euphrates area. He noted that the &handler8 for the tribal

leaders in this area is xxxxx, who has long

family ties locally.

 

¶4. (S) The public reason for xxxxx trip to Tehran

was for a medical check-up. He privately told xxxxx that his trip was more for pleasure

than medical treatment and included one or more short-term

&marriages8 (i.e. with state-sanctioned prostitutes) and

other entertainment. xxxxx shared that other (unnamed)

tribal leaders had enjoyed similar privileges while guests of

the Iranian regime recently.

 

Dashed expectations

-------------------

¶5. (S) The Sheikh suggested that some Iraqi figures are more

susceptible to Iranian influence because of disillusionment

with the United States. During the meeting with xxxxx asked repeatedly, &Why have the Americans let us

down?8 After he and other tribal sheikhs visited the White

House and met then-President Bush in 2008, he expected to

benefit financially from the Americans. Instead, he

suggested that the Americans did nothing for him, even after

he reported on Iranian activities in Muthanna (Ref A). &The

United States did not secure their friends, the sheikhs,

financially, and has left them vulnerable to Iranian

temptations.8

 

¶6. (S) xxxxx also complained that while tribal leaders

in fairly stable areas used their influence to help minimize

insurgent activities over the past several years, they have

received nothing for their efforts. Cooperative sheikhs in

insurgent hotbeds like Anbar, in contrast, received benefits

from the Americans. xxxxx cited Abu Risha as an

example, noting he received money, projects, and other

perquisites for his cooperation. He finished by noting that

several of the White House-invited tribal leaders have been

quietly grumbling. He states that he has had conversations

on this perceived inequity with parliamentarian xxxxx from Diwaniyah.

 

¶7. (S) Additionally, xxxxx was frustrated with

the current regime in Baghdad. He stated that the United

States' support of the Maliki government has only increased

Iran's influence in Iraq, enabling operatives to influence

political decisions and diminish national sovereignty. The

Iraqi government has not made progress in fighting poverty,

it has failed to provide essential services, and it is full

of corruption. He asked if the United States is supporting

Iran. &Why? Because you have American troops on the

ground, but you are advancing Iranian interests without

costing them anything.8

 

Comment

-------

¶8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known

Q8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known

for shifting their loyalties based on financial

considerations. PM Maliki's Isnad/Tribal Support Councils

are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Susceptible

sheikhs will trade their influence for financial support

especially if the sheikh is not independently wealthy.

(Note: xxxxx and

does not independently enjoy a large bankroll. End note.)

In turn, the sheikh can mobilize supporters, when needed

(e.g. Ref . The influence, however, is rented and not

bought. If the financial contributions suddenly stop, much

of the support may also cease. xxxxx considers this true

for Iranian influence in the region as well. If Iran

continues to pay for support among influential sheikhs, the

 

Islamic Republic will likely increase its influence. If and

when the money dries up, so will the cooperation among these

rented sheikhs. End Comment.

[salim]

وثيقه ويكيليكس في شهر اذار 2009

 

جلسه بين المالكي و قياده القوات الامريكيه

تتناول مواضيع مختلفه ربما اهمها هو تساؤل المالكي حول امكانيه السماح لشركه شيفرون الامريكيه بالتنقيب عن النفط في المناطق الحدوديه مع ايران مما يتطلب العمل داخل ايران وانه سيكون مضطرا لاحاله العقد على شركه غير امريكيه في حاله عدم حصول الشركه الامريكيه على استثناء وتم وعده ببحث الموضوع مع اوباما

 

في موضوع الكهرباء تعهد المالكي بالحصول على تخصيصات حتى ولو اضطر الى استقطاع رواتب المسؤولين

ف"الكهرباء مسأله حيويه لنا" كما قال

 

في مساله متابعه احد قاده تنظيمات الصحوه في الفضل المدعو المشهداني المتهم بتقديم تسهيلات للارهابيين , تخوف الامريكان من دخول هذه المنطقه الشعبيه. المالكي رد بحزم انه خاض معارك اكبر ولن يخيفه هذه المجموعه من قطاع الطرق

 

 

في مساله مجاهدي خلق , اوضح المالكي ان الايرانيين هددو بضرب معسكر اشرف وحاججوا العراقيين كيف تسمحون للاتراك بضرب عناصر حزب العمال داخل العراق ولا تسمحون لنا بنفس العمل

طالب الامريكان بنقل عناصر المنظمه الى احد معسكرات الجيش الامريكي البعيده عن الحدود

 

 

فيما يتعلق بالامن , اوضح المالكي نظريته في ضروره اعتماد الاستخبارات بديلا عن القوه وعدم قناعته باستراتيجيه نقاط التفتيش

 

فيما يتعلق بدور اكبر للشرطه , ابدى المالكي حذرا حيث ان تشكيلاتها لازالت غير منضبطه كمت هو الحال مع الجيش وذكر الامريكان بما تم كشفه من عصابه داخل دائره الجوازات تقوم بقبض الرشاوي لاصدار جوازات تحمل صورا غير حقيقيه لاصحابها يقوم عناصر مطلوبه بالتنقل بها

 

توضح طبيعه النقاش عن ثقه بالنفس عاليه جدا من قبل المالكي وطرحه للنقاط بشكل منطقي

 

http://wikileaks.as50620.net/cable/2009/03/09BAGHDAD791.html

Monday, 23 March 2009, 09:27

 

 

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000791 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 03/20/2029 TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MARR,

PTER, IZ, EPET, EFIN SUBJECT: CDA, CG AND PM DISCUSS EVOLVING SECURITY CONCERNS, THE BUDGET, OIL CONTRACTS;

CDA DELIVERS DEMARCHE ON CAMP ASHRAF REF: A. SECSTATE 26167 B. BAGHDAD 00442 Classified By: Charge d' Affairs

Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 ( a nd (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: In a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri

al-Maliki on March 19, Charge d' Affaires (CDA)

Butenis and Commanding General MNC-I Lieutenant General (LTG) Austin discussed evolving security concerns,

politics surrounding the budget, efforts to capture former Sons of Iraq (SOI) leader Adel Mashadani, and asked

about the way ahead for reforms to improve management of hydrocarbons; additionally, the CDA delivered a

demarche on Camp Ashraf (REF A) to which the PM acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue but emphasized the

domestic Iraqi pressure as well as specific threats from Iran that he faces on the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK)

residents of Camp Ashraf. He said, however, that they would not be harmed, that he would abide by the

humanitarian assurances provided to the USG, and that he would not forcibly remove anyone to Iran - even those

suspected of crimes - but that they could not remain in Iraq. LTG Austin noted vast improvements in the security

 

environment over the last year, commenting that the GOI's operation in Basra last March was a pivotal moment in

 

Iraq's history. The PM remarked that "maintaining victory is much more difficult than achieving victory," noting

 

that Iraqi security forces must adapt to new threats posed by smaller clandestine terrorists cells and

emphasized that intelligence would be key to this end. In response to the CDA's query about payments due to

General Electric for power generation contracts, the PM said that the contracts would be paid even if it had to

come out of their own salaries. LTG Austin expressed his gratitude to the PM for resolving budget problems

related to payment of the SOI, to which the PM responded that the COR is playing political games with the budget.

 

With regard to hydrocarbons, the PM asked for the U.S. position on direct contracts with U.S. firms and on U.S.

firms developing cross border fields on the Iran border. End Summary. ¶2. (S) LTG Austin informed the PM that

General Odierno was in Jordan and asked about the PM's recent trip to

Australia. The PM said that the trip was productive, but noted that it was very long. The position of the

Australian government is a very good one, he reiterated. ---------------------------- An Evolving Security

Threat ---------------------------- ¶3. (S) LTG Austin reminded the PM that this time last year they were in

Basra, adding that "so much has changed

since then." Basra was a defining point in Iraq's history, he told the PM. The PM agreed, commenting that

"maintaining victory is much more difficult than achieving victory." The PM said that "they

(insurgents/terrorists) are still out there," but they have lost control of the cities and have become "gangs"

that move from one area to the next. "We need to build our intelligence capability to track these clandestine

gangs." The time of armed confrontations (battles) is over, he said. "We have to adjust our forces to counter

this new threat and intelligence will play a key role in this," al-Maliki warned. He questioned whether or not

existing plans or strategies, e.g., focusing on checkpoints, are still applicable. "We have to evolve our forces

to compensate for the changing security environment and emerging threats," he said. ¶4. (S) LTG Austin said

that the PM and General Odierno are of Q4. (S) LTG Austin said that the PM and General

Odierno are of a like mind on this matter. He remarked that the Iraqi Police (IP) would need to assume a greater

 

responsibility for internal security, while the Iraq Army (IA) would focus on external threats. The PM quickly

responded that the IA plays a critical role in ongoing security operations and would continue to do so,

particularly in light of the drawdown of U.S. forces. "There is no substitute for the IA in a security role,"

he said. "I don't want to risk withdrawing the IA, particularly in light of the drawdown of U.S. forces," he

reiterated. Perhaps, he said, this will happen after we ensure that the insurgents and al-Qaida Iraq (AQI) will

not come back. ¶5. (S) The PM said that "we must continue to develop the police." They need weapons and

equipment and additional

training in combating terrorism. There have also been some problems within the IP, noting the recent arrest of

 

a "gang" within the passport office that was taking bribes for counterfeiting passports (photo-substitution) of

suspected former Ba'ath Party members. He said that the police taking bribes is a serious problem that undermines

security in Iraq. BAGHDAD 00000791 002 OF 003 "Terrorists can use our passports to move around freely with

absolute anonymity." LTG Austin responded that the

IP is twice as large as the IA and that it would take some more time to develop, acknowledging that the IA is

far more capable at present. PM al-Maliki responded that the IP would eventually assume responsibility for

internal security, allowing the IA to focus on external threats. -------------------------------- Politics and

 

the Budget Process -------------------------------- ¶6. (S) LTG Austin thanked the PM for his help with the

SOI. "I thought that there would be more problems with

them getting paid, but it now seems to have been resolved," LTG Austin remarked. The PM said that the COR may

have been playing political games with the budget and that he had taken money from the MOI's budget to pay the

salaries of the SOI. The COR is trying to sabotage our efforts, he said. The CDA took this opportunity to ask

about the GOI's plan to fund this year's payments to GE on the contract signed last year for electrical

generators. The PM assured the CDA that the payments would be made, even if the money had to come from their

own salaries. The PM said that "we can not sacrifice electricity (referring to the GE contract), or security, of

which the SOI are an important part, even if we have to cut the budget in other areas." ----------------------

----------- Former SOI Leader Adel Mashadani --------------------------------- ¶7. (S) Updating the PM on

the status of former SOI leader Adel Mashadani (REF , XXXXXXXXXXXX. The PM responded

that he is running out of patience on this matter and that it had already taken too long. He said that

Mashadani's presence is a direct challenge to the GOI. He said that "we must develop a plan that minimizes

collateral damage but has some acceptable risk," comparing the situation to Basra. This is a big problem, the PM

said. "I will have our special forces and intelligence units work out a strategy and present it to you, we don't

 

want to wait too long," al-Maliki advised. LTG Austin said that they are already working with Iraqi Special

Forces units in the area, noting they had recently collaborated to arrest two suspected AQI operatives in

Fadhel. "We will work with your forces to develop a plan, but we want to be cautious," LTG Austin said. ¶8. (S)

The PM was insistent that we not wait too long, fearing that Mashadani might escape or that the GOI would

be perceived as being complicit in Mashadani's criminal activity, or worse, that the GOI is incapable of acting

 

against him. The PM said that we have gone after tougher and stronger targets than him, adding that we should no

 

t fear him. LTG Austin reiterated that he only wants to minimize casualties but that he understands the PM's

concerns. ¶9. (S) Turning to the CDA, the PM asked about the arrival of Ambassador Hill. The CDA said that

Ambassador Hill

will have confirmation hearings in the Senate on March 25 and that, hopefully, he would arrive in Iraq sometime

in April. The Qhopefully, he would arrive in Iraq sometime in April. The PM asked the CDA if she foresaw any

problems. She responded that some Senators had expressed concern with Ambassador Hill's lack of experience in the

 

Middle East and over his negotiations with North Korea. She said that Ambassador Hill had already met with

Senators McCain and Graham to address such concerns. She expressed optimism that he would be confirmed by the

Senate, noting that he was one of the Department's most accomplished diplomats. The PM said that he had discussed

Ambassador Hill with President Obama when they last spoke and that President Obama said that Ambassador Hill

"had his complete confidence" and that he is "the right man for the job." The PM told the CDA that "we welcome

him to Iraq." ------------------------------------------- Oil Reform Proposals and Direct Contracts --------

-----------------------------------

¶10. (S) The CDA asked the PM about the status of the reform proposals from

the oil symposium hosted by Deputy

Prime Minister Barham Saleh in early March. She said that it was a BAGHDAD 00000791 003 OF 003 good sign that

the government had formalized the symposium's conclusions into recommendations for government

decision, and asked if the package would need only COM agreement or would also have to go to the COR for approval

. The PM said no, he does not intend for the reform proposals to go to the COR and that he would do everything to

 

avoid this, commenting that the COR would "take us into a political maze," which was completely unnecessary.

¶11. (S) Sadiq Rikabi, political advisor to the PM, asked the PM to inquire about the USG's position on direct

contracts with international oil companies. The PM noted that he is in favor of direct contracts, in order to

avoid the delays inherent in a bidding process. The PM said he is currently in negotiations with Chevron to

develop various oil fields, to include a cross-border oil field with Iran (NFI). The PM claimed that Chevron had

told him that it had already raised the issue of a cross-border development with Tehran as well. (Note: We have

no independent confirmation of this; end note.) The PM asked the CDA about the political feasibility of such a

deal involving a U.S. firm working both sides of a cross-border field, given current USG policies toward Iran.

The CDA noted that U.S. law on sanctions would apply, but added that the Administration was reviewing its

policies on Iran. PM al-Maliki said that he prefers to go with Chevron on the deal; however, he remarked that if

U.S. rules prevent Chevron from doing this project, he would approach a non-American firm. ----------------------

---------------- PM's Response to Demarche on the MEK --------------------------------------

¶12. (S) The CDA informed the PM that she had been directed by Washington to deliver a demarche on Camp Ashraf (

REF A). The CDA delivered the points in the demarche, without interruption by the PM. The PM then expressed some

frustration and questioned why the GOI had to act so responsibly towards a organization determined to be a

terrorist group by both Iraq and the U.S.. He noted that this created daily problems within the GOI. He asked the

CDA to try to understand the very difficult situation that the GOI was in. "It is not because of Iran," he said.

"We have great internal pressures to resolve this matter." The PM noted that he had been around for the last

20 years and knows very well who the MEK are and what they have done. The PM complained "they (MEK) are at the

al-Rasheed hotel, meeting with COR members and conspiring against the GOI." He said that Iran had asked how the

GOI could support cross border military actions by Turkey against the PKK, but not allow Iran to take similar

action against the MEK at Camp Ashraf. He added that he is very concerned about a message delivered by Iran that

it would attack the MEK at Camp Ashraf if no action was taken soon. Additionally, al-Maliki asked, given the

drawdown of U.S. bases, whether the U.S. could help the GOI to use one of the transferred facilities - far from

the Iranian border - as a new location for the MEK. LTG Austin told the PM that he will look into this

possibility. ¶13. (S) The PM reassured the CDA that he would not take any action against the MEK. He said that

he would abide

by the humanitarian assurances provide by the GOI to the USG. He told the CDA that the GOI would not remove any

of the Camp Ashraf residents to any country, including Iran, where they would be harmed. "We will not forcibly

return any of them to Qwould be harmed. "We will not forcibly return any of them to Iran, even those suspected of

crimes," al-Maliki stated. But, "they must understand that Iraq is not their home." The CDA noted that the

European Union had delisted the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization and that we were working with other

countries to encourage them to relocate the MEK. PM al-Maliki said that he met with ICRC President Jacob

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kellenberger on March 18 who had also raised this issue with him and that they had discussed this issue at length

.